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The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into 
After-Arising Technology:  
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning  
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS 
Broadly speaking, courts and commentators have offered two theories to explain the 
relationship between the literal scope of a patent claim and after-arising technology (AAT), 
i.e. technology that is not discovered until after a claim has been filed.  The fixation theory 
asserts that claim scope is and/or should be fixed on the date a claim is filed and that this 
fixation makes it impossible for the claim to encompass AAT because a claim must grow in 
some sense after the filing date in order to encompass AAT.  In stark contrast, the growth 
theory argues that literal claim scope does and/or should encompass AAT on a routine 
basis and that literal claim scope therefore cannot be fixed on the date of filing. 
Finding neither of these theories satisfying, either descriptively or normatively, this 
Article rejects them.  More specifically, it rejects a logical premise that both theories share, 
namely that simultaneous fixation of and growth in literal claim scope is a logical 
impossibility.  The concept of the literal scope of a claim is ambiguous in several ways.  
Courts can—and routinely do—fix one concept on the date of filing to achieve certain 
goals, such as furthering public notice, while at the same time allowing a distinct concept to 
grow and absorb AAT to achieve other goals, such as providing sufficient incentives.  Every 
time a court addresses whether AAT falls within the literal scope of a valid patent claim, it 
necessarily constructs the things claimed by a patent and defines the nature of the meaning 
that permits the claiming language to describe those things.  Literal claim scope can 
remain fixed and yet literal claim scope can grow to encompass AAT at the same time (in 
different senses of the concept of literal claim scope, of course) provided that a court makes 
tactical decisions in the course of constructing things and defining meaning. 
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The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into 
After-Arising Technology:  
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning  
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS∗ 
[A] patent system must be related to the world of 
commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The literal scope of a patent claim is not limited to the particular things 
that an inventor actually discloses in detail in her patent application.  
Rather, contemporary patent claims are peripheral claims.  They use 
descriptive language to mark the outer boundary of a category of inventive 
things that extends well beyond the specific embodiments of an invention 
that the inventor discloses.  So long as the fictional person having ordinary 
skill in the art of the invention (the PHOSITA) can make, use and 
understand the structure of a non-disclosed embodiment at the time the 
patent application is filed, a claim can describe that non-disclosed 
embodiment, too.  This rule of constructive disclosure is both descriptively 
uncontroversial and normatively desirable if patents are to create 
incentives and lure people into inventive and innovative pursuits.  Without 
this rule, either the incentives would be too meager, because competitors 
could design around patent claims with only trivial investment, or the cost 
of applying for patent protection and disclosing all conceivable 
embodiments would be so great that the game (patent protection) would 
frequently not be worth the candle (the cost of the application). 
However, the terra firma of the constructive disclosure rule comes to 
an end when a non-disclosed, allegedly infringing product or method 
incorporates after-arising technology (AAT)—technology that is not 
invented until after the filing of a patent application.  Here, the alleged 
infringer is an inventor, too (although she may not be recognized as an 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington.  I thank Barton 
Beebe, Dan Burk, Jeff Leftsin, Mark Lemley, Mike Madison, Peggy Radin, Joshua Sarnoff, and 
Samson Vermont for their comments.  I also thank the attendees of a faculty colloquium at the 
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College of Law.  Finally, I thank Stacey Horvick, Richard Li-Dar Wang, and Megha Patel for their 
assistance with research. 
1 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 
(C.C.P.A. 1965)). 
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inventor under the patent laws and she may not seek patent protection).  In 
recent years, judicial and academic attention has been lavished on the 
question of how far back toward the prior art a patent claim can reach,2 but 
very little attention has been paid to the equally important question of how 
far beyond the technology constructively disclosed by an inventor and into 
future technology a claim can reach.   
Broadly speaking, there are two competing theories that stake out 
opposing doctrinal positions on the relationship between literal claim scope 
and AAT.  On the one hand, there is what can be called the fixation theory.  
Both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and 
patent commentators regularly argue that literal claim scope is incapable of 
the post-filing growth that is required to encompass AAT because literal 
claim scope is fixed on the date of filing.  In gross, the argument is that 
literal claims “cannot capture the later-developed technologies because to 
do so would require the claims to be interpreted as they are understood at 
some time after the filing date.”3  In part, advocates of this rule emphasize 
the better public notice that results from claims whose meanings are fixed 
at an early date.4  In part, advocates of the fixation theory also support their 
position by arguing that control over AAT is normatively undesirable 
because it is tantamount to control over something that the patent applicant 
did not invent.  “[T]he applicant must be the ‘inventor’ of the things 
covered by the patent claims.”5  “Because, at the time of the . . . 
application, . . . [those] skilled in the art [did not know] of the existence of 
[the allegedly infringing AAT, the AAT] cannot be within the scope of the 
claims . . . . To grant broader coverage would reward [the inventor] for 
inventions he did not make.”6  The doctrine of equivalents unquestionably 
allows a patentee to reach beyond literal claim scope to control some AAT, 
but this flexibility has, through rhetorical feedback, only reinforced the 
reifying effect of the fixation theory as it pertains to literal claim scope: 
“Without a doctrine of equivalents, any claim drafted in current 
                                                                                                                          
2 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (refining the “teaching, 
suggestion or motivation” test for nonobviousness). 
3 Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 165 (2005); see also id. at 167–68 (“[R]ecent case law has emphasized the 
temporal limitation on literal claim meaning, prohibiting the literal capture of later-developed 
technologies.”). 
4 See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 
116 (2005) (arguing in favor of fixing a claim’s meaning on the date of filing because delaying fixation 
until the date of infringement “would require the scope of patents to change over time” and would 
mean that “a patent’s scope would not be fixed, but could differ from infringer to infringer as time 
passes”).   
5 Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters. Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., 
concurring). 
6 Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Chiron Corp. 
v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (stating that valid 
claims should not “be construed broadly enough to encompass technology that is not developed until 
later and was not enabled by the original application”).  
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technological terms could be easily circumvented after the advent of an 
advance in technology.”7  
On the other hand, there is what can be called the growth theory.  The 
assertion that literal claim scope never expands after filing to encompass 
AAT is plainly false as a descriptive matter.8  A number of high-profile 
cases expressly sanction the reach of literal claim scope into AAT,9 and, 
yet more troublingly, these cases are only the tip of an iceberg of ongoing, 
post-filing growth in literal claim scope.  The routine phenomenon of 
blocking patents—successively issued patents that encompass the same 
technological thing—implies that the scope of a patent claim grows over 
time to encompass technologies that by definition are not known to the 
PHOSITA at the time of filing.10  Given the run-of-the-mill nature of 
blocking patents, some commentators assume that courts do not actually 
follow the black letter rule that requires the fixation of claim scope at the 
time of filing and that courts, instead, fix claim scope only at the time of 
infringement.11  
In terms of their pragmatic effects on the relationship between literal 
claims and AAT, the two theories are opposites.  The fixation theory holds 
that the ex ante fixation of literal claim scope required for effective public 
notice renders impossible the growth required for a claim to literally 
encompass AAT.  The growth theory holds that the pervasive ex post 
growth in literal claim scope required to ensure sufficient incentives or to 
allow coordinated development of technological prospects renders 
impossible the ex ante fixation of literal claim scope.   
Yet, despite the fact that the theories paint starkly different portraits of 
patent protection, neither one provides a satisfying descriptive explanation 
of how the contemporary patent regime actually seems to work.  Patent 
protection finds a middle ground somewhere in between absolute fixation 
and unbridled growth.  One way to explain this middle ground is through 
judicial oscillation between the theories,12  but this explanation, too, seems 
                                                                                                                          
7 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
8 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
267–68 (1977) (noting that the scope of a patent is not commensurate with the scope of the inventor’s 
discovery and that the “‘hornbook’ rule is very misleading”). 
9 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 55–61, 65. 
10 See infra notes 66–78 and accompanying text (illustrating the growth in literal claim scope 
caused by blocking patents). 
11 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 295–97 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that “[f]or purposes of infringement, . . . the [claim 
language] is determined at the time of the alleged infringement”); see also Lemley, supra note 4, at 104 
(discussing “the well-established principle that the meaning of the claim term for infringement 
purposes [is] determined as of the time of infringement, not the earlier filing date” but mounting a 
normative argument against the principle). 
12 Contemporary patent doctrine has been called a patchwork of “entirely inconsistent visions of 
the proper footprint of the [literally claimed] invention and how far an inventor can reach toward things 
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to miss the mark in many cases.  The curious puzzle of contemporary 
patent protection is not that courts alternate between the fixation and 
growth theories but rather that literal claim scope frequently seems to be 
both fixed and growing at the same time.  Claims routinely encompass 
AAT, yet the growth required to achieve this end undermines neither the 
stability of literal claim scope at the time of filing nor the capacity of a 
claim to provide effective public notice. 
To illustrate the inadequacy of both the fixation and growth theories, 
consider a simple hypothetical involving successive inventors in the art of 
coffee sleeves—the bands of material that slip onto disposable coffee cups 
and insulate the drinker’s fingers from the heat of the coffee.13  An 
inventor invents the clasping coffee sleeve, a strip of cardboard with 
interlocking slots:   
 
The inventor claims “an insulating band capable of encircling a disposable 
cup.”  After the inventor files her claim, two subsequent improvers make 
additional contributions to the art of coffee sleeves.  One improver invents 
and patents a lightweight, insulating plastic, and she fabricates clasping 
coffee sleeves from it.  A second improver invents and patents a 
nonobvious geometry for the coffee sleeve that allows the strip to be pre-
shaped into a circular band and yet stored in a flat configuration that can be 
easily made annular with one hand:  
 
In these hypotheticals, a court would likely allow our original inventor’s 
claim to grow to encompass the improvers’ AAT.  However, this ex post 
growth does not seem to disrupt or upend the meaning of the claim term 
“an insulating band” that was fixed at the time of filing.  
                                                                                                                          
that come after the invention.”  Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
27–28 (2005) (addressing the “footprint” of claims to “biospace” inventions). 
13 These coffee sleeve hypotheticals are explored at greater length in infra Part II.D. 
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Neither the fixation nor the growth theory adequately explains what 
happens in easy cases like the coffee sleeve hypotheticals.14  The choice 
between the fixation and growth theories demanded by the commentary on 
the relationship between literal claim scope and AAT seems like a false 
choice.  It seems instead like courts can have their cake and eat it, too.  
This both-and result is what this Article calls the fixation-growth paradox 
of literal claim scope: literal claim scope can remain fixed at the time of 
filing, yet it can (and routinely does) grow to encompass AAT 
nonetheless.15   
When what the extant models suggest should be happening does not 
map onto what actually appears to be happening, the best approach is often 
to change models, and that is what this Article argues patent judges and 
commentators should do.  This Article provides a theory that explains the 
fixation-growth paradox.  The theory both saves appearances, describing 
more accurately than the dominant theories what happens in easy patent 
cases involving allegations that AAT literally infringes, and provides the 
tools that courts would need if they were to attempt to further fine-tune the 
reach of literal claim scope into AAT so as to achieve normative goals. 
The fixation and growth theories share a fundamental premise.  Both 
presume that the stabilization of literal claim scope required for effective 
public notice is logically incompatible with the growth in literal claim 
scope required for AAT to infringe.  They differ only with respect to 
whether fixation or growth prevails.  This Article rejects this premise.  It 
outlines not one, but two mechanisms through which courts can and 
routinely do resolve the fixation-growth paradox without contradiction so 
as to enable simultaneous fixation and growth.  The mechanisms are 
deceptively simple.  There are several ambiguities in the concept of the 
literal scope of a claim, and courts can (and routinely do) fix one concept 
on the date of filing to further public notice while at the same time 
allowing a distinct concept to grow and absorb AAT.  To explain these 
mechanisms, this Article undertakes a meditation on the nature of a 
peripheral patent claim and the ambiguities in the concept of literal claim 
scope that pervade contemporary patent rhetoric.   
Part II presents the fixation-growth paradox in greater detail, and it 
frames the ambivalence-based theories used to explain the paradox pursued 
in this Article.  Because a peripheral patent claim uses descriptive language 
to mark a set of things, patent lawyers and judges use the term “scope” to 
invoke two distinct concepts: thing-scope—the size of the set of distinct 
                                                                                                                          
14 But cf. infra note 74 (refining the notion of an easy case). 
15 The term is intended as a riff on the “temporal paradox” of enablement and literal infringement 
put forward by Robert Merges.  Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on 
the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 379–80 n.73 (1992).  However, Merges’ theory of 
the temporal paradox is a core example of a growth theory, positing that literal claim scope can grow to 
encompass AAT only because it is not actually fixed on the date of filing.  See infra note 65.   
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types of things that a patent owner may prevent others from making, using 
or selling—and meaning-scope—the generality of the language used in the 
text of the claim.  Additional drilling reveals further ambiguities nested 
within both thing-scope and meaning-scope as well.  Whether they realize 
it or not, courts inevitably both construct things and define the meaning of 
meaning whenever they talk about the reach of literal claim scope into 
AAT.  The choices that courts make in the course of constructing things 
and defining meanings determine whether the literal scope of a peripheral 
claim can remain fixed on the date of filing in one sense while expanding 
after that date to reach into AAT in another sense.  
Part III addresses thing construction.  More specifically, it addresses 
courts’ construction of the distinct thing-types that courts must tally in 
order to determine thing-scope.  Courts have some discretion in selecting 
the granularity at which thing-types are defined, and how courts exercise 
this discretion affects the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  When 
courts construct thing-types coarsely rather than finely, they collapse larger 
collections or genuses of discernable thing-tokens into a single thing-type.  
Coarser thing-types, in turn, allow the inclusion of more AAT within the 
fixed thing-scope of a claim.  The property of the AAT that makes it after-
arising is more likely to be overlooked, and the AAT is more frequently 
labeled as belonging to the same thing-type already disclosed in the patent.  
Drawing from a philosophical literature that grapples with the nature of 
things, Part III concludes with a rough first pass on the descriptive inquiry 
into the granularity at which courts actually do construct things. 
Part IV addresses the meaning of meaning.  Philosophers of language 
argue that there are two plausible theories for explaining how descriptive 
language achieves meaning.  Roughly stated, denotational meaning, or 
reference, depends principally on relationships between words and the 
things in the world for which those words stand, whereas ideational 
meaning, or sense, depends principally on relationships between words.  In 
everyday, unmediated communication, the difference between these 
theories of meaning is largely without practical consequence, but the 
convention of fixing the meaning of a claim on its historical date of filing 
transforms it into a difference that makes a difference.  If courts use 
denotational meaning in claim construction, they must choose between the 
fixation and growth theories because the fixation of meaning-scope entails 
the fixation of thing-scope.  However, if courts use ideational meaning, 
they can anchor the meaning of a claim to the date of filing and still allow 
the thing-scope of the claim to grow over time to encompass AAT because 
ideational meaning permits play between thing-scope and meaning-scope.  
As the previous part did, Part IV also concludes with a roughly hewn 
descriptive argument, illustrating the different contexts in which courts 
define the meaning of meaning differently.   
Part V offers a brief normative argument about how to move forward 
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once the import of thing construction and the meaning of meaning has been 
put openly on the table.  Courts should not search for principles that are 
exogenous to patent policy to justify all of their decisions.  Rather, things 
and meanings should sometimes be viewed as policy levers that courts 
manipulate to tailor the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.16  The 
understanding of how courts manipulate things and meanings presented in 
this Article therefore provides both conceptual tools that allow courts to 
identify normatively relevant sub-categories of AAT and instrumental tools 
that allow courts to sanction the reach of literal claim scope into some, but 
not all, of those categories.  In sum, this Article rejects the stark division 
between “the realm of philosophy” and “the world of commerce” that has 
been endorsed by the Supreme Court in patent law.17  It undertakes an 
inquiry into the former in order to lay bare the tools that courts can, do and 
should use to adjust patent doctrine to serve the interests of the latter. 
II.  THE FIXATION-GROWTH PARADOX 
This Part lays out the fixation-growth paradox of literal claim scope in 
detail and frames the remainder of the Article as a demonstration of how 
courts resolve the paradox without contradiction by either constructing 
things or defining meaning.  
A.  The Scope of a Peripheral Claim 
Peripheral claims are descriptive texts.  They specify the necessary and 
sufficient criteria for the inclusion of a thing within the set of things that a 
patentee can exclude others from, inter alia, making, using, and selling.18  
Only if the claim language describes (or, in patent lingo, “reads on”19) a 
thing does the claim encompass the thing. 
Peripheral claims earn their name because they are supposed to give 
the public notice of the full extent of the claim, right out to its “outer 
boundar[y].”20  Giving notice to the public of claim scope reduces 
uncertainty and minimizes the cost of navigating a patent-filled 
                                                                                                                          
16 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (advocating that courts use economic 
reasoning to generate industry-specific variation in their application of patent law); Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (same). 
17 See supra text accompanying note 1.  But cf. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (suggesting an approach to the doctrine of equivalents that is 
attuned to philosophical concerns about language and things in stating that “the nature of language 
makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application”). 
18 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  Patent claims can describe either objects (machines, manufactures 
and compositions of matters) or events (processes).  Id. § 101.  This Article uses the term “things” 
loosely to encompass both.  Cf. infra note 206 (noting that events can be defined in an object-like 
fashion by describing them in terms of properties of the spatiotemporal regions in which they occur). 
19 Amhil Enters. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
20 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997). 
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technological landscape.21  The way in which peripheral claims perform 
this public notice function becomes more apparent after considering an 
alternative technique of marking a patentee’s interest: the central claim.  In 
a central claiming regime, a publicized prototype marks the exemplary 
embodiment of the patentee’s interest, and courts determine claim scope on 
a case-by-case, as-needed basis by querying how similar an allegedly 
infringing thing is to the prototype.  Unlike central claims, peripheral 
claims are said to mark the metes and bounds of a patent because they 
facilitate the ex ante identification of the outer limit of the patentee’s 
interest.22 
Two distinct concepts populate the everyday understanding of the 
literal scope of a peripheral claim among patent lawyers and judges.  
Peripheral patent claims are at the same time describing language and sets 
of described things, and this duality carries over into how the concept of 
claim scope is used in patent rhetoric.23  Patent lawyers sometimes measure 
claim scope as a function of the meaning of the claim’s descriptive 
language.24  In fact, courts often use scope in a fashion that makes it 
synonymous with word meaning.  “[T]he full scope of [a term’s] ordinary 
meaning” is, and is nothing more than, the term’s ordinary word 
meaning.25  Here, scope is a quality of language that tracks the generality 
or specificity of word meaning.26  This concept of the scope of a peripheral 
                                                                                                                          
21 Potential competitors must choose whether to license patent rights, design around them, use the 
prior art, or abandon efforts in the technological field altogether.  These choices are less costly and less 
risky when there is clear notice.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) 
(noting the public benefit of increased predictability of patent scope). 
22 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).  But cf. infra 
text accompanying notes 231–33 (noting that this analogy misleadingly reifies literal claim scope).  
23 Claim scope has yet other meanings to other audiences.  Economists equate claim scope with 
market power, and thereby allow claim scope to turn on both the things within claim scope in a patent-
lawyerly sense and the things outside of it (in addition to consumer preferences).  See generally 
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 103–07 (2004) (distinguishing legal and 
economic conceptions of claim breadth and explaining variations among the economic conceptions).  
Property law academics may treat the notion of claim scope as pertaining to the scope of exclusive 
rights that a patent owner has vis-à-vis any given thing described by the claim.  See, e.g., JOSEPH 
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 420–33 (2d ed. 1997) 
(discussing issues pertaining to the scope of an easement).  The patent lawyerly concept of claim scope 
is more akin to the concepts of scale and configuration in real-property discourse than to the concept of 
scope.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE. L.J. 1315, 1332–35 (1992) (discussing 
the efficient scale of property in land in relation to the scale of the activities conducted thereon); Henry 
E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 
144–61 (2000) (discussing a scattered configuration of property boundaries). 
24 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(analyzing the extent to which claim construction is a legal, factual, or mixed issue); R. Polk Wagner & 
Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s wavering 
approach in claim construction). 
25 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  
26 See D. ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS AND 
PRAGMATICS 50 (2000) (portraying greater generality in meaning as “a more extensive area of quality 
space”).  
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claim is the claim’s meaning-scope.  Patent lawyers in other instances 
assume that literal claim scope is not a quality of language but a set-
theoretical construct made of distinct, possible things.  In other words, 
scope is “the number of competing products and processes that will 
infringe the patent.”27  This concept is thing-scope.  Thing-scope measures 
the size of the set of distinct things described by the claim.  The larger the 
set is, the broader the thing-scope of the claim.  Importantly, the inventory 
of the number of distinct things required to measure thing-scope does not 
depend on the number of instances of tangible things existing in the actual 
world at any given time.  Thing-scope is unaffected by a patentee’s 
decision to manufacture ten or ten thousand widgets.28  Thing-scope grows 
only with an increase in the inventory of the distinct thing-types known to 
fall within the patentee’s property interest, not the number of thing-tokens 
that exist in the actual world.29  Except in the calculation of damages, 
references to “things” or “sets of things” in patent law invoke types, not 
tokens.  
Meaning-scope and thing-scope are distinct concepts.  Meanings and 
things are, metaphysically speaking, apples and oranges.30  Furthermore, 
there is no single, correct concept of claim scope.  Both meaning-scope and 
thing-scope are integral to patent practice.  At the end of the day, patentees 
are interested in having exclusive rights to a claim (set of things), not 
exclusive rights to a claim (language).  The latter is closer to what a 
copyright affords an author than to what a patent grants an inventor.  
However, the claim (language) is critical because it is the legally codified 
demarcation of the claim (set of things).  
B.  The Black Letter Doctrines of Fixation 
Black letter patent doctrine places restrictions on both meaning-scope 
and thing-scope that are fixed on or pegged to the date on which a claim is 
filed.  Claim construction requires fixation of meaning-scope, and the 
disclosure doctrines ensure that thing-scope is commensurate to the 
                                                                                                                          
27 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (1990).  
28 But cf. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39 (1975) (“A claim is an 
abstraction and generalization of an indefinitely large number of concrete, physical objects.”). 
29 The notion that a full inventory of the set of things within thing-scope is possible is misleading 
in two ways.  First, the identity of a thing is malleable.  See infra Part III (exploring thing construction).  
Second, the set is likely to be infinite.  Even the modulation of a single, scalar property can create an 
infinite number of distinct things.  While claims must be definite and bounded, see 35 U.S.C. § 112 
para. 2 (2006) (requiring claims to “distinctly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as his invention”), a bounded claim requires only that the PHOSITA can draw a 
line to distinguish claimed and unclaimed things.  It does not limit thing-scope to a finite set.  
Nonetheless, thing-scope can be relatively larger or smaller even if thing-scope is infinite.  See PAUL R. 
HALMOS, NAIVE SET THEORY 93 (1960) (presenting Cantor’s Theorem in set theory). 
30 But cf. infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining that the denotational meaning is a set of possible things). 
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PHOSITA’s understanding of the things disclosed in the specification. 
Courts use claim construction to determine the word meaning of claim 
language.31  The more general the word meaning, the larger the set of 
things the claim describes, and the more valuable the claim is to the 
patentee.32  The inevitable vagueness and ambiguity in word meaning 
makes claim construction a highly contentious and often outcome-
determinative undertaking.33  Because a lack of clarity in word meaning 
undermines the public notice that justifies the peripheral claiming regime 
to begin with,34 courts have developed two rules to reduce uncertainty in 
word meaning.  
First, courts have anointed the PHOSITA as the official arbiter of 
world meaning.35  The PHOSITA’s ordinary and customary understanding 
of language is dispositive of meaning-scope.  The same word can mean 
different things to different audiences—a “small gap” likely means 
something different to a construction engineer than it means to a 
nanotechnologist—so it is important to know whose understanding is 
legally controlling.  
Second, recognizing that meaning can evolve over time, courts also 
root the meaning-giving PHOSITA on a specific date in history—the date 
on which a claim is filed.36  As the Supreme Court noted in the context of 
statutory interpretation, “[i]t does not follow that when a newly invented or 
discovered thing is called by some familiar word, which comes nearest to 
expressing the new idea, that the thing so styled is really the thing formerly 
meant by the familiar word.”37  A “small gap” may mean something 
different to a construction engineer on an earlier date when building 
materials can only be fabricated with a significant margin of error than it 
does on a later date when fabrication machines work on smaller tolerances.  
                                                                                                                          
31 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (reviewing the 
basic principles of claim construction).  
32 General claim language can also be problematic for a patentee if it broadens the claim so that it 
reads on the prior art.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (codifying novelty and nonobviousness).  Because 
this Article focuses on the reach of literal claim scope into AAT which, by definition, is not prior art, it 
presumes that enlarging claim scope is in the patentee’s interest. 
33 Cf. CRUSE, supra note 26, at 51–52 (distinguishing ill-definedness—the problem of 
“designat[ing] a region on a gradable scale”—and laxness—the habitual application of a word “in a 
loose way”—as two subdimensions of vagueness); id. at 108 (noting that ambiguity involves words 
with two or more “antagonistic readings”). 
34 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
35 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.  
36 Id.  Actually, there are two candidates that vie for coronation as the date of fixation: invention, 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), and filing, Schering 
Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Because the Federal Circuit recently 
sought to defuse the tension by noting that in most instances the “time of invention” is “the effective 
filing date of the patent application,” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, this Article presumes that meaning-
scope is fixed on the date of filing.  However, the opposite presumption would not alter the arguments 
presented.  
37 Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 116, 147 (1863). 
 2008] THE REACH OF LITERAL CLAIM SCOPE 505 
These two fixation rules do not eliminate the problems of vagueness 
and ambiguity.  Among other issues, courts famously disagree about the 
relative importance of dictionary definitions and contextually inflected 
word usages in a patent’s disclosure when assessing the legally binding 
meanings of the words that make up claims.38  Nonetheless, the pinning of 
meaning-scope to the historically fixed PHOSITA makes word meaning 
relatively clearer and fosters public notice of claim scope. 
Enablement and written description are the two disclosure doctrines 
implicated in fixation of thing-scope on the date of filing.39  Enablement 
requires patent applicants to disclose enough information in the 
specification that accompanies the claims to allow the PHOSITA to make 
and use the full scope of the claim without undue experimentation at the 
time the claim is filed.40  Written description requires that the patent 
applicant disclose enough information to demonstrate “invention” or 
“actual possession” of the full scope of the claim to the PHOSITA at the 
time the claim is filed.41  The possession standard is a judicial work in 
progress, but it seems to require roughly that the patent applicant disclose 
enough information to demonstrate conceptual possession of the physical 
structure of the invention.42  If patent applicants fail to satisfy either 
doctrine, their claims are not valid. 
It is the inherent knowledge attributed to the PHOSITA that gives rise 
to the ability of the constructive disclosure to extend beyond the literal 
disclosure.  To stave off the possibility of information overload, patent 
applicants are encouraged not to disclose what the PHOSITA already 
knows, to disclose literally only a limited number of embodiments, and to 
rely on the inherent knowledge of the PHOSITA to extend those literal 
embodiments into a broader disclosure.43  For example, even if the inventor 
                                                                                                                          
38 See infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
39 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006).  Best mode is also a disclosure doctrine, id., but it does not 
have a commensurability requirement and thus does not fix claim scope. 
40 See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
41 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
42 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The disclosure 
must allow one skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity of the subject matter purportedly 
described.”).  Courts have only recently applied the written description requirement to claims filed with 
the original application, as opposed to claims amended during the course of prosecution.  See id. at 
979–81 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (discussing how written 
description has only recently come to be viewed as its own doctrine, distinct from enablement, when 
applied to original claims).  Whether courts should apply written description in addition to enablement 
to originally filed claims is the subject of considerable controversy.  E.g., Janice M. Mueller, The 
Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633 (1998) (arguing that written description as applied to original claims is 
an inappropriate “super-enablement” requirement). 
43 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 923 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[C]laimed 
subject matter ‘need not be described in haec verba’ in the specification to satisfy the written 
description requirement.”) (quoting In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); see also 
Hybridtech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent 
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of a widget discloses only a seven-sided widget that is two inches long and 
made of wood, she is entitled to a peripheral claim to a “seven-sided 
widget” that encompasses seven-sided widgets of any length and of any 
material that the time-bound PHOSITA could conceive (under written 
description) and make and use (under enablement) upon reading the patent 
disclosure.  How far constructive disclosure extends beyond literal 
disclosure is affected by a number of variables, including the predictability 
of the art and whether a large quantity of experimentation would be 
required to produce a particular embodiment.44  Most importantly for the 
present purposes, however, is the date on which the PHOSITA is rooted.  
Because the knowledge attributed to the PHOSITA in a technological field 
may grow over time, a textually identical disclosure may not demonstrate 
enablement or possession of the claim’s full scope to the PHOSITA of an 
earlier date, but may nonetheless do so for a PHOSITA positioned later in 
time.45 
The disclosure doctrines shape patent protection in two distinct ways.  
First, they are information-forcing rules.  An incentive to disclose 
justification of patent law depicts patent protection as one side of a quid 
pro quo: the state grants private rights to exclude from the claimed 
invention to the inventor, and the inventor must disclose to the public 
information that the patentee otherwise could have attempted to keep 
secret.46  The disclosure doctrines ensure that the inventor fulfills her 
disclosure obligations and does not strategically withhold information.  
Second, the disclosure doctrines restrict the permissible thing-scope of a 
patent claim by mandating that the thing-scope be quantitatively 
“commensurate with” or “no broader than” the disclosure at the time of 
filing.47  If the inventor claims a set of things that is larger than the set that 
                                                                                                                          
[disclosure] need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”). 
44 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing factors that are considered in 
determining whether undue experimentation would be required to produce an embodiment of an 
invention in light of the information in the disclosure).  The predictability of the art and the quantity of 
experimentation are important in determining whether a disclosure enables an embodiment of an 
invention or whether the embodiment is unenabled, scope-actualizing AAT.  See infra note 194 
(defining scope-actualizing AAT).  However, predictability is not relevant to understanding how courts 
sculpt the reach of literal claims into AAT through thing construction, see generally infra Part III, and 
the meaning of meaning, see generally infra Part IV.  
45 See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
46 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491–92 (1974) (holding that trade secret 
law is not preempted by federal patent law because of a conflict with the incentive to disclose 
justification of patent protection). 
47 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that 
written description requires “claims [to] be no broader than the supporting disclosure”); Amgen, Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that enablement ensures that claim 
scope remains “commensurate with” the disclosure).  Many formulations of the disclosure doctrines 
note that valid claims need only be “reasonably” commensurate to the disclosure.  See, e.g., In re 
Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., concurring).  Because reasonableness may 
provide wiggle room to hide the policy choices that courts make when they construct things and define 
meaning, this Article does not address it. 
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she has taught the PHOSITA how to make and use without undue 
experimentation at the time of filing, the claim is invalid for lack of 
enablement.  Similarly, if the inventor claims a set of things that is larger 
than the set of which she has demonstrated possession at the time of filing, 
the claim is invalid for lack of a sufficient written description.  If an 
inventor is not strategically withholding information and cannot enable or 
demonstrate possession of the claim’s full thing-scope on the desired date 
of filing, she can either delay the filing date until she can satisfy the 
disclosure requirements or reduce the scope of her claim so that it is 
commensurate with the disclosure.48 
C.  The Overt Conflicts Between Fixation and Growth 
The previous subsection outlined the black letter law in the claim 
construction and disclosure doctrines that requires both the meaning-scope 
and the thing-scope of a claim to be fixed in some manner on the date that 
the claim is filed.  This subsection examines both how courts have applied 
these doctrines and how commentators have characterized courts’ 
applications.  In some cases, courts interpret the doctrinal mandate for 
fixation as precluding the expansion of literal claim scope after the date of 
filing that is required for the claim to encompass AAT.  These holdings 
exemplify the fixation theory: fixation trumps growth in literal claim 
scope.  In other cases, however, courts have expressly recognized that 
literal claim scope can and should grow after the date of filing so as to 
encompass AAT.  Judges and commentators have depicted these holdings 
as examples of the growth theory in action: regardless of what black letter 
law suggests should happen, growth trumps fixation in literal claim scope. 
In claim construction, the fixation theory posits that the fixation of 
meaning-scope makes it impossible for literal claim scope to encompass 
technologies that were not known to the PHOSITA at the time the claim is 
filed.  In effect, the fixation theory holds that the fixation of meaning-scope 
at the time of filing entails the fixation of thing-scope at that time.49  For 
example, consider the Federal Circuit’s concurring opinion in Superguide 
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises.50  The Superguide court construed the 
meaning of the claim term “regularly received television signal.”51  The 
allegedly infringing technology used digital signals, but analog signals 
were the industry norm and thus the only signals regularly received on the 
                                                                                                                          
48 If the patent applicant fails to enable or demonstrate possession of any embodiment, reducing 
claim scope is not an option.  See Glass, 492 F.2d at 1232–33 (invalidating claims under the 
enablement doctrine because the specification did not enable any embodiment within the claims). 
49 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 3, at 165, 167–68. 
50 Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., 
concurring).  But cf. infra note 230 (arguing that Superguide is unusual in that it involves a temporal 
index). 
51 Superguide, 358 F.3d at 876. 
 508 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:493 
date that the claim was filed.  Presuming that a post-filing shift in the set of 
claimed things is tantamount to an impermissible post-filing shift in 
meaning, the concurrence concluded that the fixation of meaning-scope on 
the date of filing prevented the claim from reading on devices receiving 
digital signals.52  The majority opinion in Schering Corp. v. Amgen also 
exemplifies the fixation theory brought to bear on claim construction.53  
Schering, the patentee, claimed recombinant DNA molecules coding for “a 
polypeptide of the IFN-α type.”  After the claim was filed, new variants of 
IFN-α unknown at the time of filing were discovered.  The Federal Circuit 
held that fixation of the meaning-scope of the claim left the AAT outside 
of the patent’s literal scope as a matter of law.  “Because, at the time of . . . 
application, neither [the inventor] nor others skilled in the art knew of the 
existence of, let alone the identity of, the specific polypeptides now 
identified as subtypes of IFN-α, those subtypes cannot be within the scope 
of the claims.”54   
In contrast to these cases in which the fixation theory explains the 
outcome of the court’s claim construction, however, there are cases in 
which courts recognize that the allegedly infringing device incorporates 
AAT and that there may be literal infringement.  For example, the majority 
opinion in Superguide concluded that the literal language of the claim 
could describe the post-filing regular receipt of digital signals.55  The 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, 
Inc. also reaches a similar conclusion.56  In Laser Alignment, the allegedly 
infringed claim included the limitation “a collimated narrow beam of 
light.”57  The allegedly infringing technology used a laser to produce a type 
of light beam that was not invented until after the claim had been filed.  
Like the concurrence in Superguide, the district court held that the fixation 
of meaning excluded AAT from claim scope as a matter of law and that a 
post-filing change in the thing-scope to which the claim language referred 
entailed an impermissible post-filing change in meaning.58  The Seventh 
Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that the fixation of meaning-scope 
on the date of filing did not prevent the claim from reading on AAT.59  As 
the Federal Circuit has stated, “[t]he law . . . does not require that an 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. at 897 (Michel, J., concurring).  
53 Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
54 Id. at 1349–50, 1353–54; see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (“I think the proper approach . . . is to address cases of new 
technology by construing claims, where possible, as they would have been understood by one of skill in 
the art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology 
. . . .”). 
55 Id. at 881. 
56 Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866, 871–73 (7th Cir. 1974).  
57 Id. at 869 n.1. 
58 Id. at 871. 
59 Id. at 872–73.   
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applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible 
future embodiment of his invention.”60  To explain these outcomes, 
commentators have suggested that the principle of ex ante fixation has 
been abandoned and the principle of ex post growth has been adopted in its 
place.61 
Although it is thing-scope rather than meaning-scope that is at issue, 
there is a parallel conflict between the fixation and growth theories in 
courts’ applications of the enablement and written description inquiries.  
The disclosure analyses are doctrinally anchored in time on the filing 
date,62 but precisely how they are anchored—i.e., precisely what must be 
commensurate with the PHOSITA’s understanding of the disclosure on the 
date of filing—is a point of contention.     
The variant of the fixation theory at work in disclosure cases posits 
that the full scope of the claim at the time of infringement must be 
commensurate with the constructive disclosure of the specification at the 
time of filing.  Under the fixation theory, thing-scope must remain 
commensurate to the time-bound PHOSITA’s understanding of the 
disclosure from the time of filing through the end of the patent’s twenty-
year term.63  By definition, AAT cannot be fully enabled and possessed 
according to the information that the patentee discloses on the filing date,64 
so a claim’s thing-scope is not commensurate with the disclosure if it 
literally encompasses AAT. 
In contrast, the variant of the growth theory at work in the disclosure 
cases concludes that only the full thing-scope of the claim at the time of 
filing must be commensurate with the constructive disclosure of the 
specification.  In other words, only the thing-scope of the claim at the time 
of filing needs to be enabled for and possessed by the PHOSITA, and 
thing-scope is permitted to grow over time thereafter.  Under this 
interpretation, the disclosure doctrines are utterly indifferent to the post-
                                                                                                                          
60 SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
61 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 295–97 (arguing that “[f]or purposes of infringement, 
. . . the [claim language] is determined at the time of the alleged infringement”); Lemley, supra note 4, 
at 109 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit in Laser Alignment allowed the claim to encompass AAT only 
because it delayed the fixation of meaning until the time of infringement). 
62 See supra note 40–41 and accompanying text. 
63 See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating a 
claim under the written description doctrine “[b]ecause [the allegedly infringing AAT] technology did 
not even exist at the time of the . . . filing, the record conclusively supports that the Chiron scientists 
did not possess and disclose this technology”); cf. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural 
Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (implying that the contemporary interpretation of the 
disclosure doctrines generally obviates the need for the reverse doctrine of equivalents because it 
prevents literal claims from encompassing AAT in the first place).   
64 If the specification both enables and demonstrates possession of an allegedly infringing 
technology in all of its particularities on its date of filing, the patent constructively discloses the 
technology, and the technology cannot be AAT.  Cf. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 
F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a method not developed until after a patent was filed 
cannot be disclosed by the patent).  
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filing expansion in thing-scope that is triggered by the absorption of AAT 
into literal claim scope.65  In short, growth trumps fixation as the 
commensurability requirement places no restriction on the ability of literal 
claim scope to expand and encompass AAT. 
D.  The Suppressed, Paradoxical Reality of Both Fixation and Growth 
Both the fixation and growth theories offer logically coherent models 
of how patent doctrine could, in theory, deal with the relationship between 
literal claim scope and AAT.  As the previous subsection demonstrates, the 
critical commentary on the relationship between literal claim scope and 
AAT has been a debate about which of these two theories does or should 
prevail.  
However, this either-growth-or-fixation framework of the commentary 
fails to capture what actually occurs in the day-to-day reality of 
contemporary patent practice.  Where the fixation and growth theories 
mandate an election of either fixation of or growth in literal claim scope, 
contemporary patent law seems to achieve a both-and solution on a regular 
basis.  This is the fixation-growth paradox of literal claim scope: literal 
claims regularly expand to encompass AAT, yet courts usually do not raise 
a red flag to warn of impermissible growth in claim scope because neither 
the stability of literal claim scope nor the efficacy of the claim’s public 
notice is threatened.   
The simplest way to illustrate that literal claim scope is routinely 
perceived as remaining fixed while at the same time expanding so as to 
reach into AAT is to highlight the everyday occurrence of physical 
blocking patents (blocking patents)—claims in earlier- and later-issued 
patents that both read on the same technology.66  That an inventor from a 
later generation (improver N+1, or simply N+1) can claim a patentable 
improvement on the existing technology developed by an inventor from an 
earlier generation (inventor N, or simply N) is a straight-forward idea.67  
                                                                                                                          
65 The classic case expounding the growth theory is In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 
1977) (holding that enablement at the time of filing is unaffected by later changes in the state of the 
art).  The idea that the enablement doctrine requires scrutiny of claim scope only at the time of filing is 
what underlies the “temporal paradox” of enablement and infringement proposed by Robert Merges.  
See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 295–97; Merges, supra note 15, at 379–80 n.73. 
66 There are two types of blocking patents.  Physical blocking patents involve successive patents 
that both read on the same thing-token.  See, e.g., Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695 (1886).  
Economic blocking patents involve claims that read on physically distinct parts of a thing-token that 
consumers desire as a whole.  See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual 
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1010 n.87 (1997) (explaining how patents for distinct yet 
complimentary goods held by different inventors may block each owner from obtaining maximum 
economic benefit).  To make the point that literal infringement of AAT necessitates some form of post-
filing growth most clearly, the discussion in this Part equates blocking patents with physical blocking 
patents.  However, even economic blocking patents mandate a weak form of post-filing growth in 
literal claim scope.  See infra note 128. 
67 Cf. ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 6:8 (5th ed. 
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However, it is less intuitive that inventor N and improver N+1 may have 
blocking patents and that N+1 may not be able to practice her invention 
without N’s permission.  The counterintuitive nature of blocking patents is 
attributable, in part, to the weakness of N+1’s patent position.  Patent law 
affords N+1 only a right to exclude others from practicing the patented 
improvement; it does not afford her an affirmative privilege to use her 
improvement.68  Yet, the counterintuitive nature of blocking patents can 
also be traced to the unexpected strength of N’s position.  Whenever there 
are blocking patents, the literal scope of N’s earlier or “dominant” claim 
reaches beyond what N actually invented and encompasses the things 
produced by N+1’s later or “subservient” invention.69  N+1’s improvement 
literally infringes N’s claim despite the fact that the improvement is, by 
definition, not known to the PHOSITA who has read the disclosure of N’s 
patent on its date of filing.70  In other words, whenever there are blocking 
patents, the scope of the dominant claim grows over time in some sense 
and reaches into AAT.71 
For example, consider two blocking-patent hypotheticals involving 
coffee sleeves.  Inventor N invents the clasping coffee sleeve, a strip of 
cardboard with interlocking slots that, when assembled, insulates a coffee 
drinker’s hand from a hot disposable cup.72  Presuming that N is the first 
inventor of a coffee sleeve, she can disclose her clasping coffee sleeve and 
lay claim to “an insulating band capable of encircling a disposable cup.”  
After N files her claim, assume also that two improvers from generation 
N+1 realize that the clasping coffee sleeve actually invented and disclosed 
by N is not the pinnacle of coffee sleeve technology.  The first N+1 invents 
and patents a lightweight, insulating plastic, and she fabricates clasping 
coffee sleeves from it.  The second N+1 invents and patents a nonobvious 
geometry for the coffee sleeve that allows the strip to be pre-shaped into a 
circular band and yet stored in a flat configuration that can be easily made 
circular with one hand (while the coffee drinker has the hot cup of coffee 
                                                                                                                          
2004) (explaining that Jepson claims are frequently used to claim improvements to existing 
technologies).  
68 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
69 Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
70 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (codifying the nonobviousness requirement).  Because 
nonobviousness is measured at “the time the invention was made,” id., but claim meaning is fixed on 
the date the claim is filed, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, a limited exception to this rule 
exists if the subservient invention comes after the invention of the dominant invention but before the 
date on which a patent to protect the dominant invention is filed. 
71 Technically, the existence of blocking patents is not critical to the fixation-growth paradox.  
The paradox can arise whenever N’s claim grows to encompass N+1’s technology and N+1’s 
technology is inventive vis-à-vis N’s disclosure.  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 43–45 (discussing 
constructive disclosure).  The paradox exists even if N+1 does not seek a patent.  
72 For a picture of N’s invention, see supra text accompanying note 13.  The coffee sleeve is a 
commonly used technology for teaching basic patent principles, in large part because of its simplicity 
and familiarity.  See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 36–48. 
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in the other).73 
If the patentee N were to sue either of these improvers N+1 for literal 
infringement, what would a court do?  These hypotheticals are designed to 
be easy cases:74 courts would allow N’s claim to encompass the N+1s’ 
AAT.  In other words, courts would not use the fixation theory.  (If they 
were to use the fixation theory, there would no literal infringement.)  
Furthermore, unless prompted to do so, the defendants would be unlikely 
to raise growth-related arguments favoring noninfringement and invalidity.  
The inclusion of AAT within literal claim scope does not seem to change 
the meaning of the claim or unmoor it from its fixed meaning at the time of 
filing before the N+1s discovered their improvements.75  Neither the 
fixation theory nor the growth theory can explain the fixation-growth 
paradox that characterizes these easy cases. 
Post-filing growth literal claim scope without significant disruption of 
claim stability or public notice pervades the patent regime in many easy 
cases.76  There is nothing special about coffee sleeves.  The hypothetical 
does not involve exceptional facts.  To the contrary, the coffee sleeve 
hypotheticals can be extrapolated to almost any technology.77  They 
                                                                                                                          
73 For a picture of this second N+1’s improvement, see supra text accompanying note 13.  The 
Patent and Trademark Office deemed U.S. Patent No. 5,826,786 (filed Oct. 27, 1995), which claims 
N+1’s new geometry, to be nonobvious in light of U.S. Patent No. 5,425,497 (filed June 20, 1995), 
from which the illustration of inventor N’s clasping coffee sleeve is taken.  
74 But cf. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591, 662–69 (1981) (arguing that interpretive construction is required even in cases that are easy 
in the sense of being doctrinally uncontroversial in the relevant legal community). 
75 The statements about what courts and litigants would do are blatant predictions.  There is no 
long history of patent litigation in the art of coffee sleeve technology and patent doctrine concerning 
AAT as a whole is far from settled, so there is no airtight answer about what the law is in these cases.  
However, the coffee sleeve hypotheticals are employed, in part, because of the author’s belief that the 
predictions reflect a strong consensus among scholars of patent law about the likely outcome.  
(Importantly, this consensus about the outcome is not indicative of a doctrinal consensus about why the 
cases come out this way.)  The consensus on the after-arising materiality hypothetical is explicit.  See, 
e.g., Feldman, supra note 12, at 9–10 (offering a “one embodiment” rule for enablement when applied 
to the property of materiality in mechanical inventions); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, 
Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1976–77 (2005) (presuming that a claim to a tennis racket can encompass tennis 
rackets made from after-arising materials if materiality is not expressly recited as a limitation in the 
claim).  Express and on-point prognostication about cases like the after-arising geometry hypothetical, 
however, is not as common.  One reason it is difficult to find examples of cases similar to the after-
arising geometry coffee sleeve hypothetical is that such cases are viewed as run-of-the-mill examples 
of literal infringement and therefore are not litigated. 
76 Indirect evidence of the prevalence of AAT within literal claim scope can be found in the patent 
doctrines that would be irrelevant if claims never literally encompassed AAT.  See, e.g., O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1853) (invalidating claims to “principles” in the abstract); Scripps Clinic & 
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents).  
77 Because coffee sleeve technology is likely to be considered a discrete innovation industry, the 
growth in literal claim scope triggered by the inclusion of AAT is not limited to cumulative innovation 
industries.  But cf. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 190 (arguing that industries characterized by discrete 
innovation do not generate much AAT).  However, the descriptive argument that AAT occurs in all 
industries does not undermine the existence and normative significance of the distinction between 
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illustrate situations in which AAT falls within literal claim scope without 
fanfare—situations that may not even be recognized as involving AAT 
because no disruption to claim stability seems to be implicated.78  These 
situations may not involve radical technological breaks with the past, but 
the fixation theory does not purport to draw the difficult line between what 
does and does not constitute a technological paradigm shift or to exclude 
from literal claim scope only AAT that exceeds some threshold of social or 
technological importance.  
E.  Resolving the Paradox 
This Article grapples with the fixation-growth paradox not by insisting 
that stability be privileged over growth, or vice versa, but by rejecting a 
premise that structures both theories.  Both theories posit that accepting the 
statements “literal claim scope is fixed on the date of filing” and “literal 
claim scope grows over time after the date of filing” as true produces a 
logically impossible patent regime.  This Article instead posits that both 
statements can be true because together they are an equivocation—they 
mislead by using an ambiguous phrase, namely “literal claim scope,” twice 
without specifying that each instance of the phrase carries a different 
meaning.79  The concept of literal claim scope in some of its senses can and 
does remain fixed as of the date of filing, even as the concept expands in 
other senses in the manner required for a claim to encompass AAT.  The 
paradox of fixed yet expanding literal claim scope can thus be resolved 
without contradiction by recognizing the multiplicity of concepts that 
populate the everyday, patent-lawyerly use of the term “literal claim 
                                                                                                                          
industries characterized by discrete and cumulative innovation.  See Merges & Nelson, supra note 27, 
880–82 (arguing that claim scope should be narrower in cumulative innovation industries).  Cumulative 
innovation industries are those in which major, direction-shifting and/or path-opening technological 
innovations that build on earlier innovations occur at temporal intervals that are significantly less than 
the term of a patent.  After-arising improvements of the more ordinary, refinement variety occur 
regularly in both types of industries. 
78 There is Federal Circuit precedent for dismissing the existence of AAT even when the allegedly 
infringing technology is a patented improvement covered by a subservient patent.  In Al-Site Corp. v. 
VSI International Inc., the court addressed a patent infringement suit involving hangers for displaying 
eyeglasses, and its ability to find literal infringement hinged on the fact that the allegedly infringing 
hangers did not constitute after-arising technology.  Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 
1320–22 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (using a jury verdict of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents to find 
literal infringement as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 because, inter alia, the accused 
device did not embody AAT).  Ignoring the improvement patent on the defendant’s technology, id. at 
1321–22, the court dismissed the existence of AAT by zooming in, framing the defendant’s technology 
as nothing more than the “holes” that exist in the hanger, and stating that “holes do not constitute an 
after-arising technology.”  Id. at 1322.  By framing the physical part of the defendant’s device that 
corresponded to a particular claim limitation so narrowly, the court framed the after-arising aspect of 
the technology out of existence.  Similarly, in the coffee sleeve hypothetical, a court might just say 
bands generically are not AAT, ignoring the relevant after-arising geometry that clearly makes the 
defendant’s band after-arising. 
79 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 604 (4th ed. 2000) 
(defining “equivocal” as “[o]f uncertain significance”). 
 514 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:493 
scope.”  One way in which to frame the goal of this Article is simply to 
tease out the different meanings that, without adequate differentiation, are 
commonly invoked when courts and commentators talk about literal claim 
scope. 
The equivocation-based response to the paradox is, in theory, a simple 
one, but there is a redundancy that makes the project more complex.  There 
is not a single mechanism for resolving the paradox.  There are two 
independent mechanisms, each of which implicates a different category of 
AAT.  One mechanism focuses on the nature of things and the way in 
which thing-scope can be fixed in one sense and yet expand in another to 
encompass AAT.  The other addresses an ambiguity in the meaning of 
meaning.  Under one definition of meaning, but not the other, meaning-
scope can remain fixed on the date of filing while allowing thing-scope to 
expand over time to encompass AAT.  Parts III and IV address each of 
these mechanisms in turn. 
III.  THING CONSTRUCTION  
Although claim construction is a well-known practice in patent 
infringement litigation, this Part argues that courts must also regularly 
engage in thing construction in patent cases involving allegedly infringing 
AAT.  The distinct things that serve as the metric of thing-scope are 
conceptual, not physical, entities.  They are types, not tokens, and therefore 
they do not have fully formed, objective existences prior to patent 
infringement proceedings.  Before courts can determine whether thing-
scope has remained fixed or grown over time, they must initially construct 
the thing-types that are required to calculate thing-scope.80  Thing 
construction holds the key to explaining one mechanism through which the 
fixation-growth paradox operates to achieve a both-stability-and-growth 
result in the disclosure doctrines.  In other words, thing construction 
exposes one reason why in some cases it is not necessary to elect either the 
                                                                                                                          
80 This Part does not argue that courts construct the tangible or extensional instances of infringing 
things.  It offers only a weak construction thesis.  The construction lies in human cognition: courts 
construct the thing-types that classify and give order to their understanding of what the infringing 
thing-tokens are.  This weak construction thesis is deeply influenced by the work of both Mike 
Madison and Mark Kelman.  Madison has argued that it is important to be conscious of the 
construction of not only legal doctrine but of things as well in order to understand and shape 
intellectual property law.  See generally Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and 
Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005) (categorizing and evaluating five methods of 
thing-making).  But cf. infra note 239 (disagreeing with Madison that courts uniformly employ a things 
by nature approach in patent law).  Kelman makes the argument more sweepingly.  Courts must engage 
in “interpretive construction” to turn the events to which law is applied into something courts can 
analyze doctrinally.  Interpretive construction can be outcome determinative because it produces the 
premises upon which courts unleash doctrinal logic (or “rational rhetoricism” in Kelman’s terms).  See 
Kelman, supra note 74, at 591–93 (discussing two phases of legal argument: interpretive construction 
and rational rhetoricism).  Following Madison’s lead, this Part merely illustrates that courts also 
produce things through interpretive construction before they unleash rational rhetoricism. 
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fixation theory or growth theory when explaining how the disclosure 
doctrines work.  Certain thing constructions, but not others, allow the 
fixation of literal thing-scope at the time of filing and yet still permit the 
literal claim to encompass AAT when it is subsequently discovered.81 
Part III.A initially offers a proof of principle.  Using a simplistic 
hypothetical to make its point clearly, it demonstrates how courts can use 
thing construction to make a claim read on AAT without triggering post-
filing expansion of thing-scope.  Courts have discretion to construct thing-
types in either a coarse- or fine-grained fashion.  Through a coarse-grained 
thing construction, courts throw large genuses of distinct infringing thing-
tokens into a single conceptual thing-type basket, thereby masking the 
existence of the growth that a claim undergoes when it encompasses AAT.  
The coarser courts make thing-types during thing construction, the larger 
the number of after-arising improvements that can infringe without 
triggering an expansion in thing-scope.   
Part III.B then takes a rough first pass at understanding the conditions 
under which courts actually regulate the reach of literal claim scope into 
AAT by constructing things either finely or coarsely.  A philosophical 
literature addressing the nature of things posits a distinction between the 
properties that a thing possesses intrinsically and those that it possesses 
extrinsically—a distinction that can be traced to a physical or micro-
structural essentialism about what things really are.  This distinction 
explains some, but not all, of courts’ thing constructions.  Courts rely on 
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties to place a hard 
limit on how finely they construct things.  However, it is not clear whether 
courts use the distinction to place a hard ceiling on how coarsely they 
construct things. 
                                                                                                                          
81 The importance of thing construction can be most easily seen by assuming for the sake of 
argument that the disclosure doctrines require fixation of thing-scope at the time of filing.  If one 
accepts the growth theory for thing-scope—i.e., if one accepts that only the thing-scope of the claim at 
the time of filing needs to be commensurate with the disclosure, see supra note 65 and accompanying 
text—then there is less riding on thing construction.  However, universal acceptance of the growth 
theory does not provide an intuitively satisfying explanation for the way in which literal claims reach 
into AAT in all situations.  In some instances, thing construction provides an explanation that is better 
at saving the appearances of contemporary patent practice and discourse.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 136, 146.  Furthermore, even if one accepts a growth theory for thing-scope in all cases, thing 
construction may still be important in explaining the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  If one 
accepts that growth in thing-scope entails growth in meaning-scope, and one adopts the fixation theory 
as applied to meaning-scope, then thing construction offers the only mechanism to allow AAT to fall 
within the literal scope of a claim with a fixed meaning.  If thing-scope remains fixed at the time of 
filing, then meaning-scope, too, remains fixed at that time.  Thus, if a court deploys thing construction 
so that the claim can encompass AAT without adding new thing-types to the claim, there is no need to 
worry about post-filing shifts in meaning-scope.  Cf. infra Part IV (arguing that the meaning of 
meaning determines whether the fixation of meaning-scope entails the fixation of thing-scope). 
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A.  Coarse-Grained Things and the Masking of Growth in Thing-Scope 
Courts construct the things encompassed by a patent claim when they 
categorize the infinite array of infringing tokens of things into the discrete 
conceptual baskets or thing-types that are tallied to determine the claim’s 
thing-scope.82  Thing construction is simply the identification of the subset 
of the thing-tokens’ properties that are relevant to the identities of the 
tallied thing-types. 
For example, assume a simplistic claim to “paper” by the first inventor 
of paper.  Assume also a specification that discloses to the time-bound 
PHOSITA, either literally or constructively, sheets of paper with a wide 
variety of properties including sheets of paper in letter and legal sizes, 
sheets of paper that are dyed both yellow and blue with different 
chemicals, and sheets of paper inside and outside of computer-printer 
paper trays.83  How should a court calculate the claim’s thing-scope?  
Artificially restricting the inquiry to the embodiments recited above, does 
the claim describe one, two, four or eight types of things?  If there are two 
infringing sheets of paper on my desk that are as identical as imaginable, 
yet one is dyed yellow and the other blue, are they instances of distinct 
types of things or are they duplicates of the same type of thing?  By 
answering these questions, courts construct things in patent law and 
establish the metric by which thing-scope is measured. 
Thing construction determines which properties of an allegedly 
infringing technology are and are not overlooked in defining the identity of 
a thing-type.84  For example, assume that a first court treats all sheets of 
                                                                                                                          
82 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (defining thing-scope).  Categorization is not 
unique to patent law.  It is a fundamental aspect of cognition: the human mind routinely “breaks down” 
the complexity and continuity of physical reality into discrete categories or types that can be more 
readily stored, managed and processed.  See DICTIONARY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE: NEUROSCIENCE, 
PSYCHOLOGY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LINGUISTICS, AND PHILOSOPHY 41 (Oliver Houdé ed., 2004) 
(defining categorization).  Thing construction is analytically distinct from the categorization that occurs 
in claim construction and literal infringement.  The latter tasks, which are the usual suspects in the 
analysis of categorization in patent law, involve categorization in what might be considered its forward 
direction.  They start with a category defined by the claim language and query what belongs in the 
category by identifying the criteria needed for inclusion in the category (claim construction) and 
determining whether a given thing-token satisfies those criteria (literal infringement).  The construction 
of things, however, runs the categorization process in reverse.  Given a set of infringing technologies, 
what are the categories that one should create in order to house them?  Although the claim language 
determines the extent of the group of infringing things that must be categorized, it does not provide the 
criteria that define the conceptual thing-type baskets into which those infringing things should be 
sorted.   
83 The term “properties” is used here more or less in its colloquial sense.  Properties are simply 
“the attributes or qualities or features or characteristics” that things possess.  Chris Swoyer, Properties, 
in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.1, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
properties/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (offering an overview of the nuances in the notion of the 
properties of a thing). 
84 The process of categorization in its reverse direction, see supra note 82, is inherently reductive, 
and the construction of thing-types that contain thing-tokens therefore erases many differences.  
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paper, regardless of the particular chemicals with which they are dyed, as 
instances of a single thing-type.  The court erases the property being dyed 
with a specific chemical from the legal identity of the claimed things 
during thing construction.  Sheets of paper that possess the property being 
dyed with chemical X are thrown into the same conceptual thing-type 
basket as sheets of paper that have the incompatible property being dyed 
with chemical Y.  However, a second court might not overlook the property 
being dyed with a specific chemical when constructing thing-types.  It 
might treat sheets of paper that are dyed with different chemicals as 
distinct thing-types.  In tallying thing-scope, the two different courts use 
different metrics for measuring the thing-scope of the claim to “paper.”  
The first court concludes that the thing-scope of the claim to “paper” is 
smaller than the second court does, but only because it performs the 
measurement with a larger unit of measure. 
More broadly, the number of properties overlooked or erased during 
thing construction can be measured in terms of the coarseness or fineness 
of the granularity at which things are constructed.  The more coarse the 
grain of the thing-types is, the larger the number of properties erased and 
the larger the set of discernable instances of things that is thrown into the 
same conceptual thing-type basket.85  However, the more coarsely grained 
the thing-types are, the smaller the final, quantified tally of the claim’s 
thing-scope and the fewer the distinct conceptual baskets of thing-types 
that need to be counted.  In contrast, fine-grained thing-types involve the 
erasure of fewer properties, the inclusion of smaller sets of discernable 
instances of things within a single type, and the tallying of more thing-
types to determine thing-scope. 
Thing construction may seem esoteric because, unlike claim 
construction, it is irrelevant to the outcome of many cases.  Why should 
one care whether thing-scope is twice as large numerically if the units of 
measurement are half as big?  It is as though the first court describes a 
distance as one mile and the second court describes the same distance as 
two half-miles.  Whenever an allegedly infringing technology is 
constructively disclosed by a patent specification, the quantification of 
thing-scope, and thus the construction of things, presents a purely 
academic issue.  If the allegedly infringing thing is enabled and possessed 
in all of its particularities at the time of filing, courts do not need to 
construct things.  However, when the allegedly infringing technology is 
AAT, the manner in which courts construct things is not a purely academic 
exercise.  Rather, it is dispositive of whether the thing-scope of a literal 
claim can both remain fixed at the time of filing and grow to encompass 
                                                                                                                          
Categorization assigns thing-tokens to thing-types with reference to some, but not all, of the properties 
that the tokens possess. 
85 Cf. infra text accompanying note 106 (defining “indiscernibles” as a term of art). 
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AAT at the same time.   
To understand the importance of thing construction in cases involving 
AAT, it is initially critical to understand that the AAT implicated in the 
fixation-growth paradox can always be defined in terms of after-arising 
properties for preexisting things.  Such AAT is after-arising because N+1 
invents a new property or set of properties for a thing that N has already 
invented and described, either literally or constructively.86  The 
hypothetical coffee sleeves introduced in the previous Part are after-arising 
because, in relation to the original inventor’s disclosure of the clasping 
coffee sleeve, they possess the after-arising property of either being made 
from an after-arising plastic or being folded in an after-arising geometry.87  
An allegedly infringing instance of a sheet of paper may be after-arising in 
relation to the disclosure of the patent that claims “paper” because the 
sheet has the property of being dyed green with an after-arising chemical.  
Similarly, an allegedly infringing sheet of paper could be after-arising 
because it has the property being in the paper-tray of an after-arising 
computer printer.88  Considered in all of their particularities, neither a sheet 
of paper that is dyed green with an after-arising chemical nor a sheet of 
paper in the paper tray of an after-arising printer could have been 
constructively disclosed by the patent claiming “paper.”  This conclusion is 
inherent in the definition of after-arising.89 
Here is the payoff of reframing AAT in terms of after-arising 
properties for preexisting things: thing construction can mask the post-
filing growth in literal thing-scope that is required for a claim to 
encompass AAT if it employs a coarse-grained construction and erases the 
property that marks the AAT as after-arising.  This erasure renders the 
after-arising property irrelevant to the identity of thing-types and the 
distinctions between them.  When the after-arising property is not a 
definitional property of the tallied thing-types, the allegedly infringing 
AAT can be thrown into a preexisting conceptual thing-type basket created 
for the constructively disclosed embodiments.  The claim’s thing-scope 
need not expand over time for the AAT to infringe.  In contrast, if the 
property that makes the allegedly infringing technology after-arising is a 
property that defines the thing-types tallied to measure thing-scope, then 
thing-scope cannot encompass the AAT and, at the same time, remain 
                                                                                                                          
86 Perhaps some AAT can only be understood as a thing with entirely new properties.  However, 
not only is such radical AAT unusual (if in fact it exists), it is unlikely to be implicated in the fixation-
growth paradox because it will rarely fall within an earlier inventor’s claim. 
87 See supra text accompanying note 72–75 (presenting the coffee sleeve hypotheticals). 
88 It is difficult to conceive of an appropriate hypothetical based on the final example of a 
property for a sheet of paper considered above, namely the property having a particular size.  See supra 
text accompanying note 83.  An after-arising size that is not constructively disclosed by the 
specification in the patent claiming “paper” is difficult to imagine. 
89 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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fixed as of the time of filing.  The introduction of a new, distinct thing-type 
within literal claim scope makes the tally of things described by the claim 
at the time of infringement larger than the tally of things that the 
PHOSITA at the time of filing recognizes as enabled and possessed in light 
of the disclosure.  When thing construction produces thing-types at a 
relatively fine level of granularity, no both-and solution is possible.  Either 
stability must trump growth, or growth must trump stability. 
Consider again the two courts that adopt different metrics for 
measuring the thing-scope of the “paper” claim, the first identifying yellow 
and blue paper as distinct thing-types, and the second overlooking the 
difference in the property of color and classifying the yellow and blue 
sheets of paper as two instances of the same thing-type.90  If the allegedly 
infringing product is AAT in the form of a sheet of paper with the property 
being dyed green with an after-arising chemical, and if the disclosure 
doctrines require thing-scope to be stabilized on the claim’s filing date, 
then thing construction determines whether thing-scope can remain fixed 
and still encompass the AAT.  The first court (which constructed things in 
a relatively fine manner) must conclude that the green paper is not within 
the fixed thing-scope of the claim.  The green paper is an instance of a 
distinct thing-type not constructively disclosed in the specification, and the 
thing-scope of the claim cannot grow after the date of filing to encompass 
it.  Thus, either the “paper” claim is invalid under the disclosure doctrines 
or there is no literal infringement.  In contrast, the second court (which 
constructed things in a relatively coarse manner) should conclude that the 
after-arising green paper is within the fixed thing-scope of the claim.  The 
color that the sheet of paper is dyed is irrelevant to the identity of a thing-
type; the AAT is treated as the exact same type of thing that was 
constructively disclosed in the patent specification.  Here, the “paper” 
claim is enabled and possessed, and the AAT literally infringes. 
The same story about thing construction and its importance to the 
reach of fixed thing-scope into AAT can be told using the property being 
in the paper-tray of an after-arising computer printer rather than the 
property being dyed green with an after-arising chemical.  Whether this 
AAT can fall within the thing-scope of a claim to “paper” that has been 
fixed on the date of filing also depends on whether the court constructs 
things finely—viewing paper inside and outside of paper trays as distinct 
types of things—or coarsely—overlooking the property of being in a paper 
tray—when identifying the thing-types that must be tallied to measure the 
claim’s thing-scope.   
Couched in the language of equivocation,91 the both-and result of 
fixation of thing-scope at the time of filing and growth in thing-scope after 
                                                                                                                          
90 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
91 See supra text accompanying note 79.  
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that date to encompass AAT is possible because the term “thing-scope” is 
ambiguous.  The distinct things that comprise thing-scope can be defined at 
coarser or finer levels of granularity.  By choosing a coarse-grained 
definition of things as the legally relevant definition, courts can mask the 
growth in thing-scope that is appreciable only with a fine-grained 
definition.  The ambiguity between coarse and fine things allows courts to 
focus on coarse-grained thing-scope when monitoring commensurateness 
under the disclosure doctrines and render legally irrelevant whatever 
growth occurs in different, more finely parsed metrics of thing-scope.  
Thing-scope (coarse-grained) is fixed, and thing-scope (fine-grained) 
grows.  It is thus the negative implication of a coarsely defined thing that 
resolves the fixation-growth paradox without a logical contradiction.  
Whenever a property is not relevant to the conceptual basket or thing-type 
in which a thing-token belongs, that property may reflect technology not 
developed until after a claim is filed and yet no change in the claim’s 
thing-scope occurs when the claim encompasses the AAT.  
In sum, thing construction can determine whether a literal claim with a 
thing-scope fixed on the date of filing can remain valid while 
encompassing AAT.  Coarse-grained thing-types explain one mechanism 
through which courts can achieve both the fixation of thing-scope at the 
time of filing and the growth required for a claim to literally encompass 
AAT. 
B.  What Courts Do 
At what granularity do courts actually construct things in 
contemporary patent practice?  How do they distinguish the bundle of 
properties that they use to define thing-types from the remaining properties 
that they overlook?  These questions are of practical import in patent law 
because, as explored in the previous subsection, the level of granularity at 
which things are defined determines whether a claim can have a thing-
scope that has been fixed on the date of filing and, at the same time, still 
encompass AAT.  In some situations, thing construction determines 
whether literal claims can achieve both stability and growth.   
There are no statutes specifying the rules that courts should use to 
establish the granularity of things, so the parameters controlling thing 
construction are entirely within the hands of the judiciary.  One possibility 
is that courts have unfettered discretion in thing construction.  Perhaps the 
stability of literal claim scope is nothing more than a conceptual shell 
game, and courts routinely make growth in thing-scope appear or disappear 
through a sleight-of-hand shift in granularity.  Such discretion would in 
turn allow courts to extend or truncate the reach of literal claim with a 
fixed thing-scope into AAT by validating or invalidating, respectively, 
claims under the commensurability analysis of the disclosure doctrines.  At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, another possibility is that courts feel 
 2008] THE REACH OF LITERAL CLAIM SCOPE 521 
bound by a strict set of rules to always classify certain properties as 
relevant to the identity of a thing-type and other properties as irrelevant.  
Perhaps the properties of a thing that make it the type of thing that it is are 
defined by nature or convention before patent law comes into the picture.  
Furthermore, perhaps courts are bound by these rules either consciously or 
unconsciously.  If this is true, then courts do not, as a practical matter, 
exercise any discretion at all during thing construction.  
This subsection presents one candidate for an extra-legal distinction 
that could, in theory, be guiding courts’ decisions during thing 
construction: the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic properties 
of a thing.  Embodying a structural or physical essentialism about what 
things are and reflecting the way in which things are commonly discussed 
in everyday language beyond patent rhetoric, the distinction makes explicit 
what are arguably shared and wide-spread intuitions about things.  The 
intrinsic properties of a thing are those properties that are wound up with 
making a thing the thing that it is, whereas the extrinsic properties of a 
thing are the properties that are not wound up in the identity of the thing.  
If the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties were to guide 
courts during thing construction, courts would always use the intrinsic 
properties of a thing to define thing-types, but they would never use the 
thing’s extrinsic properties to define thing-types.   
This subsection tests the hypothesis that the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic properties determines courts’ decisions during thing 
construction against the Federal Circuits’ holdings in cases involving 
allegations that AAT falls within literal claim scope.  It concludes that the 
hypothesis is clearly consistent with the case law regarding the role of 
extrinsic properties in thing construction.  Courts appear to be firmly under 
the sway of an essentialist understanding of things during thing 
construction insofar as they never use extrinsic properties to define thing-
types.  However, no conclusion can be reached with respect to whether the 
inverse is true and whether courts always use intrinsic properties to define 
thing-types during thing construction.   
1.  The Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties of a Thing 
Some philosophers interested in the nature of things posit a 
metaphysical distinction between the properties a thing possesses 
intrinsically and those second-class properties it merely possesses 
extrinsically—its intrinsic and extrinsic properties for short.92  
                                                                                                                          
92 See generally Robert Francescotti, How to Define Intrinsic Properties, 33 NOÛS 590 (1999) 
(arguing that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction remains a useful philosophic tool); I.L. Humberstone, 
Intrinsic/Extrinsic, 108 SYNTHESE 205 (1996) (exploring the distinctions between the extrinsic and 
intrinsic properties); David Lewis, Extrinsic Properties, 44 PHIL. STUD. 197 (1983) (critiquing a 
proposal for distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic properties); Theodore Sider, Intrinsic Properties, 83 
PHIL. STUD. 1 (1996) (distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic properties); Peter Vallentyne, 
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Philosophers who are interested in the distinction work to define and 
defend it because they believe that it explains “legitimate intuitive 
considerations” about the nature of the things that exist in the world.93  In 
gross, the intuition is that not all of the properties of a thing-token are 
equally tied up with making that thing-token the type of thing that it really 
is.   
Only some of a thing’s properties—the intrinsic ones—derive entirely 
from what the thing is.  “A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the 
way that thing itself, and nothing else, is.”94  An intrinsic property of a 
thing is “a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be 
going on outside of itself.”95  Intrinsic properties can be traced back to the 
thing itself without any other explanation or contribution.   
In contrast, other properties—the extrinsic ones—are dependent upon 
the context of the thing or its relationships to things other than the thing 
being examined.96  Residually defined, as they usually are, extrinsic 
properties are the properties that are “not entirely about that thing” and that 
“may depend, wholly or partly, on something else.”97 
Archetypes of the extrinsic properties are relatively uncontroversial: 
the properties of being an uncle or being six meters from a rhododendron 
are extrinsic properties of Sam and my pencil, respectively.98  These 
properties describe properties of a thing-token that follow, at least in part, 
from something other than the thing itself.  Sam is an uncle because his 
brother or sister has a child.  A pencil is six meters from a rhododendron, 
in part, because of the nature of the rhododendron at issue.99  Although the 
identification of intrinsic properties can be more controversial, being six 
meters tall, being circular and having an internal structure with two parts 
                                                                                                                          
Intrinsic Properties Defined, 88 PHIL. STUD. 209 (1997) (defining intrinsic and extrinsic properties); 
Stephen Yablo, Intrinsicness, 26 PHIL. TOPICS 479 (1999) (discussing intrinsic properties).  Although 
the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” are used adjectivally to modify properties for the sake of 
convenience, they are meant to evoke a local rather than global concept of intrinsicality.  This local 
concept is most commonly expressed through the adverbial formulations intrinsically and extrinsically 
possessed properties.  See Humberstone, supra at 206–07 (explaining the global/local distinction). 
93 Humberstone, supra note 92, at 205.  Because the philosophical work involves flushing out a 
commonplace intuition, explanations of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties often 
start from the assumption that people are already familiar with the basic notion of an intrinsic property.  
See, e.g., Yablo, supra note 92, at 479 (“You know what an intrinsic property is . . . .”).  Philosophers 
are also motivated to establish and defend the distinction because it proves to be a useful tool in a 
variety of philosophical projects that are not relevant here.  See, e.g., Humberstone, supra note 92, at 
207 (listing projects). 
94 Lewis, supra note 92, at 197. 
95 Yablo, supra note 92, at 479. 
96 Cf. Humberstone, supra note 92, at 209–27 (suggesting that a relational property is a distinct 
sub-type of an extrinsic property). 
97 Lewis, supra note 92, at 197. 
98 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 83. 
99 Extrinsic properties may be admixtures to varying degrees.  Lewis, supra note 92, at 197 
(“[B]eing a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both 
are extrinsic.”). 
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are intrinsic in most circumstances.100  The shape of a thing is often taken 
as a paradigm of an intrinsic property: that the pencil on my desk is four 
inches long, that it is six-sided in cross-section and that it is pointed on one 
end are properties that the particular pencil has in and of itself.101  
Materiality, too, is conventionally viewed as an intrinsic property.102  The 
fact that my pencil is made of wood and graphite is true because of the way 
the pencil, and nothing else, is.  
The payoff of subscribing to the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties comes from being able to tell what a thing actually is 
on a metaphysical level.  Not only are intrinsic properties solely about the 
way a thing-token is, but the nature of a thing “is given by the totality of its 
intrinsic properties.”103  Thingness is equated with the totality of intrinsic 
properties.  A tally of a thing’s intrinsic properties is both necessary and 
sufficient to identify the thing-type to which the instance of the thing 
belongs.  Inversely, a tally of its extrinsic properties is not required.  Thus, 
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties leads to the 
conclusion that the intrinsic property being four inches long is constitutive 
of the thing that my pencil is but the extrinsic property being six meters 
from a rhododendron is not.  
Proponents of defining things in terms of their intrinsic but not 
extrinsic properties argue that the distinction merits recognition and study 
because it legitimizes strong, shared intuitions about the nature of what 
things are.  To illustrate the strength of these intuitions, they invoke two 
common-sense concepts about things that can be explained only by 
reference to the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction (or, at least, some distinction 
akin thereto): the concepts of duplicates versus indiscernibles and real 
change versus mere Cambridge change.  
It is perfectly intuitive to talk about two thing-tokens as duplicates.  
Sentences like “This pencil over here is a duplicate of that one over there” 
and “These two sheets of paper are duplicates” are commonplace.  Such 
talk is possible, however, only because of the intuitive nature of the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties.  Without such a 
distinction, no two things in the actual world could be labeled as 
duplicates.  Two thing-tokens are intuitively viewed as duplicates if they 
are perceived as being “exactly alike” as things.104  Yet, no two thing-
tokens existing in the actual world at the same time can be exactly alike in 
all of their properties.  At a minimum, they are located in different 
positions in space.  The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
                                                                                                                          
100 See id. (listing shape as an intrinsic property). 
101 But see generally Bradford Skow, Are Shapes Intrinsic?, 133 PHIL. STUD. 111 (2007) (arguing 
that it is difficult to defend shape as an intrinsic property in every instance).  
102 See Lewis, supra note 92, at 197 (listing internal structure as an intrinsic property). 
103 Id. 
104 See id. 
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properties sheds light on the properties that two thing-tokens must share to 
be duplicates.  Intrinsic properties are those properties with respect to 
which duplicates may not differ; things are duplicates if and only if they 
share all of their intrinsic properties.105  Because size is an intrinsic 
property, a cube with one-inch sides is not likely to be perceived as a 
duplicate of a cube with two-inch sides.  Residually, extrinsic properties 
are those properties that may differ between duplicates.  Because relation 
to a rhododendron is an extrinsic property, a pencil that is six meters from 
a rhododendron can be a duplicate of a pencil with the same size, shape, 
and materiality that is seven meters from the rhododendron.  Importantly, 
two things that are duplicates are not indiscernibles—they do not share all 
of their properties, both intrinsic and extrinsic.106  Duplicate pencils that 
are six and seven meters distant from a rhododendron are discernibly 
different, but they are still duplicate things because distance from a 
rhododendron is a mere extrinsic property of the pencil-as-thing.  In sum, 
without the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, it is 
gibberish to talk about things that are duplicates, and all that can really be 
said about two instances of things is that they are discernable.  
The intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction is also useful to differentiate 
between two intuitively different types of change that things undergo.  A 
thing that undergoes a change in an intrinsic property is said to experience 
real change while a thing that undergoes a change in an extrinsic property 
is said to experience mere Cambridge change.107  When my four-inch long 
pencil is sharpened so that it is only three inches long, the pencil has 
undergone real change.  It is a different thing after the change has 
happened; it is not a duplicate of its former self.  Similarly, if my pencil 
were miraculously to transmute from being a wooden pencil to being a 
plastic pencil, the change would be real change.  (To avoid the pitfalls of 
positing such miraculous change, the idea of mere Cambridge change can 
be modified to mere Cambridge contingency.)108  In contrast, when a 
pencil is moved one meter closer to a rhododendron (or, even more 
strikingly, a rhododendron is moved one meter closer to a pencil) or when 
Sam’s sibling has a child, the thing in question (either the pencil or Sam) 
has undergone a much weaker kind of change.  This weaker type of change 
still makes a thing-token take on properties that it did not have beforehand 
                                                                                                                          
105 Id. 
106 DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 62–63 (1986).  Indiscernability is the tighter 
bond between two objects.  It is a bond so tight that it is impossible to formulate common sense 
examples of indiscernible things in the actual world, as two material objects cannot occupy the same 
location in space simultaneously.  
107 Humberstone, supra note 92, at 207–09. 
108 See id. at 209 (explaining that a Cambridge contingency “arise[s] whenever some predicate 
true of [an object] x might not have been”).  According to this formulation, a property is extrinsic if, in 
the contingent situation that a thing does not have the property, there is no “genuine respect” in which 
the thing is different.  Id. 
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and lose others that it previously had, but, in an intuitively important way, 
the thing is still the same thing that it was before the change occurred.109  
The pencil is still intrinsically the same pencil; Sam is still intrinsically the 
same person.  This weaker type of change is mere Cambridge change.  
Again, without the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, 
the idea that there is a difference in the change that Sam undergoes when 
Sam grows taller and when Sam’s sibling has a child would be an illusion. 
Although the concepts of duplicates and mere Cambridge change can 
be used as rules of thumb or litmus tests for sorting a thing’s intrinsic 
properties from its extrinsic properties, they do not provide an analytical 
definition for the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction.  They do not 
explain an unknown concept in terms of simpler, known ones, because 
there is no way of defining duplicates or mere Cambridge change other 
than in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic properties.  All three concepts form 
a “tight little family of interdefinables.”110  The concepts of duplicates and 
mere Cambridge change only underline the value of the intrinsic/extrinsic 
property distinction in explaining our basic intuitions about the world.  The 
more important to understanding the world of things these two concepts 
are taken to be, the stronger the case for distinguishing intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties.111    
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties should not be 
confused with the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental 
properties, respectively.112  Extrinsic properties do not map onto accidental 
properties on a one-to-one basis.  For example, size is an accidental yet 
intrinsic property of a tree.  More importantly, Aristotle’s notion of 
accidental and essential properties hinges on the existence of natural kinds 
in a way that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties does 
not.  In the Aristotelian schema, an a priori hierarchy of differences 
divides the world into sets of things called natural kinds.  Each natural kind 
has a “real” definition or a set of essential properties, namely the 
differences that structure the a priori hierarchy, and part of the search for 
understanding involves identifying the natural kinds and their “real” 
definitions or essential properties.113  Inversely, sets of things that are not 
                                                                                                                          
109 There are instances in which the association of extrinsic properties and mere Cambridge 
change fails because extrinsic properties are admixtures.  See Lewis, supra note 92, at 197.  For 
example, being taller than b is an extrinsic property of thing a (provided that a is not a part of b and b 
is not a part of a) in that it is not a property that a has in and of itself.  However, a can lose this 
property either through real change in a shift in a’s height or through mere Cambridge change in a shift 
in b’s height.  Humberstone, supra note 92, at 208. 
110 Lewis, supra note 92, at 197. 
111 Cf. id. (arguing that “giv[ing] over the entire family as unintelligible and dispensable . . . 
would be absurd”).   
112 See J. Michael Dunn, Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations, 60 
PHIL. STUD. 177, 181 (1990) (criticizing “a tendency . . . to conflate intrinsic properties and essential 
properties”).  
113 See Michael R. Ayers, Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds, 78 J. PHIL. 247, 250–53 
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natural kinds do not have essential properties.  It makes no sense to search 
for the essential properties of the thing cup on a book, because cups-on-
books are not a natural kind.114  In contrast, embracing the notion of 
intrinsic properties does not, in any way, presuppose that there is a correct 
set of lines for dividing the world into natural-kind components.  
Regardless of how much matter falls within the frame chosen to delineate a 
thing, all things—including the things cups on books—have intrinsic 
properties.  
However, the physical framing of the thing under consideration can 
affect whether any given property is intrinsic or extrinsic.  Whether a 
property is intrinsic or extrinsic is contingent on the amount of matter that 
is included within the thing under consideration: 
A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes 
intrinsic properties to something is entirely about that thing; 
whereas an ascription of extrinsic properties to something is 
not entirely about that thing, though it may well be about 
some larger whole which includes that thing as a part.  A 
thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that 
thing itself, and nothing else, is.  Not so for extrinsic 
properties, though a thing may well have these in virtue of 
the way some larger whole is.115 
The things a pencil (“a thing” in the quote above) and a pencil six 
meters from a rhododendron (a different thing that is the “some larger 
whole” in the quote above) both have intrinsic properties.  However, the 
particular property being six-meters from a rhododendron is, when 
predicated of the pencil, intrinsic to the latter because it establishes a 
relationship among parts and extrinsic to the former because it is not only 
about the pencil.  
Although not governed by an Aristotelian variant of essentialism, the 
intuitive idea that some properties are intrinsic to a thing whereas others 
are not does, nonetheless, reflect a different and more modern type of 
essentialism that infects our everyday thinking.  This essentialism is 
scientific, physical, and structural: two things are identical if and only if 
they have all of the same “micro-structure,” “important physical 
                                                                                                                          
(1981) (discussing natural kinds).  The confusion between accidental and essential properties follows 
from the fact that it is possible to describe a natural kind with only accidental properties and a thing 
with only extrinsic properties.  Man is man because he is a rational animal not because he is a 
featherless biped, despite the fact that the latter, so-called necessary properties pick out the same set of 
things in the actual world that the former, essential properties do.  Id. at 252; see also DAVID CHARLES, 
ARISTOTLE ON MEANING AND ESSENCE 18–19 (2000) (distinguishing essential and necessary 
properties).  Similarly, one can describe something with reference only to its accidental properties, for 
example, the thing that is next to the telephone. 
114 See Ayers, supra note 113, at 252. 
115 Lewis, supra note 92, at 197.  
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properties,” or “determining and basic scientific feature[s].”116  The list of 
the most basic of intrinsic properties from which higher-order intrinsic 
properties like shape can be constructed resounds in quantum physics: 
spin, charge, and mass.117  Thus, the most precise list of the intrinsic 
properties of a thing roughly, or perhaps exactly, trace the identity of a 
thing to what physicists and chemists say things are.118  Reductively 
speaking, the things that make up the world are defined first and foremost 
by their internal structures. 
2.  The Hypothesis: The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic 
Properties Governs Courts’ Decisions During Thing Construction 
Reinforced by the intuitively palatable oppositions of duplicates versus 
indiscernibles and real change versus mere Cambridge change, the 
essentialist distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of a 
thing may influence how judges define thing-types.  A reasonable 
hypothesis is that the distinction serves as an extra-legal, conventional 
restriction that fills the gap left by a lack of explicit statutory guidance and 
effectively binds patent courts during thing construction.119 
Because AAT is readily defined in terms of new properties for 
preexisting things,120 the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties suggests that there are two categories of AAT.  On the one hand, 
there is intrinsic-property AAT—AAT that results from the invention of a 
new intrinsic property for the already disclosed and claimed thing.  Paper 
with the property being dyed green with an after-arising chemical is most 
intuitively viewed as an intrinsic property, at least provided that the dye is 
                                                                                                                          
116 CHARLES, supra note 113, at 5–11 (describing a form of “modern essentialism” associated 
with the work of Hilary Putnam). 
117 See Dunn, supra note 112, at 180 (noting that the precise mass and charge of a particle are 
intrinsic qualities). 
118 This, of course, is not the only authority to which deference could be paid to establish what 
things are intrinsically.  Although the result would not correspond as closely with widely shared 
intuitions about the world, the views of a cultural anthropologist could be substituted for the views of 
the physicist to arrive at a radically different set of intrinsic properties.  Cf. BRUNO LATOUR, 
REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY 63–86 (2005) 
(developing an understanding of objects that attributes agency to objects). 
119 Importantly, it is not necessary to accept the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties as a matter of metaphysics to defend the thesis that the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties is useful as a descriptive tool with explanatory purchase in the task of figuring out 
what courts do.  Rather, the strong metaphysical claim about intrinsic properties advocated by 
philosophers can be relaxed into a weaker claim about shared intuitions and convention.  So long as the 
intuitions about duplicates and mere Cambridge change, see supra text accompanying notes 104–09 
(explaining these intuitions), that are derived from the scientific, physical essentialism are real in the 
minds of judges and patent litigants, the impact of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties on how courts construct things can be real.  Using the terms suggested by Mike Madison, the 
stronger claim that courts construct “things by nature” can be translated into a weaker claim that they 
construct “things by practice.”  See infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 86–89 (defining AAT in terms of after-arising properties 
for preexisting things). 
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not merely a superficial coating but instead alters the molecular bonds 
within the paper.  Two objects with different internal molecular structures 
are not truly duplicates;121 the change that a sheet of paper undergoes when 
its molecular structure is altered is real change.122  On the other hand, there 
is extrinsic-property AAT—AAT that results from the invention of a new 
extrinsic property for the already disclosed and claimed thing.  The 
allegedly infringing sheet of paper with the after-arising property being in 
the paper-tray of an after-arising computer printer is most intuitively 
viewed as extrinsic-property AAT with respect to the disclosure of the 
earlier patent claiming “paper.”  The generic property being contained 
within something else is not entirely about the disclosed sheets of paper; it 
depends, wholly or partly, on something other than the thing to which the 
property is ascribed, namely a printer.123  A sheet of paper in a paper tray is 
readily viewed as a duplicate of a sheet of paper outside of the paper 
tray;124 the change involved in putting the sheet of paper into the paper tray 
seems like mere Cambridge change rather than real change.125 
If judges are constrained by the distinction between the intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties of a thing during thing construction, one would expect 
them, in turn, to make a distinction, whether consciously or not, between 
intrinsic- and extrinsic-property AAT in cases addressing the reach of 
literal claim scope into after-arising technology.126 
In cases involving allegations of literal infringement of intrinsic-
property AAT, courts would never side with the patent owner.  Intrinsic-
property AAT, such as the paper that is chemically altered when it is dyed 
green with an after-arising chemical, represents a newly discovered thing-
type.  The property that makes the AAT after-arising is an intrinsic 
property, and intrinsic properties are those that by definition contribute to 
the definition of a thing-type.  If a claim is to encompass intrinsic-property 
AAT, its thing-scope must expand over time.  On the date of infringement, 
there is a thing within the scope of the claim that is not a duplicate of any 
thing that was within the scope of the claim at the time of filing.  Building 
on the notion that real change would occur if a thing within the patent’s 
constructive disclosure were to turn into intrinsic-property AAT, the 
growth after the date of filing that the claim must undergo in order to bring 
                                                                                                                          
121 See supra text accompanying notes 104–06 (contrasting duplicates with indiscernibles). 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (contrasting real change with mere Cambridge 
change). 
123 See supra text accompanying note 97 (defining extrinsic properties). 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 104–06 (contrasting duplicates with indiscernibles). 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (contrasting real change with mere Cambridge 
change). 
126 The discussion in the remainder of this subsection presumes that courts employ the fixation 
theory for thing-scope.  If courts were to adopt the growth theory for thing-scope, thing construction 
might not be dispositive of the outcomes in cases involving the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  
See supra note 81. 
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intrinsic-property AAT within its ambit can be thought of as real growth.  
In theory, intrinsic-property AAT forces courts to choose either the 
fixation theory or the growth theory for thing-scope.  If the fixation theory 
prevails and the commensurability requirements of the disclosure doctrines 
require that thing-scope is fixed on the date a claim is filed, the real growth 
in thing-scope required for literal infringement is doctrinally impossible.   
In contrast, in cases involving allegations of literal infringement of 
extrinsic-property AAT, courts would always side with the patent owner.  
Extrinsic-property AAT is a token of a thing-type disclosed in the patent 
specification at the time of filing, albeit a token that is discernable from the 
disclosed things.  The property that makes the AAT after-arising is a 
property that is overlooked in the definition of thing-types.  The thing-
scope of a claim therefore need not expand after the filing date in order to 
be able to encompass newly discovered extrinsic-property AAT.  On the 
date of infringement, the coarse-grained nature of thing-types means that 
there are no new things within the scope of the claim.  The extrinsic-
property AAT is simply viewed as a duplicate of one of the things that was 
within the scope of the claim at the time of filing.  Building on the notion 
that mere Cambridge change would occur if a thing constructively 
disclosed by the patent specification were to turn into extrinsic-property 
AAT, the growth after the date of filing that the claim must undergo in 
order to bring extrinsic-property AAT within its ambit can be thought of as 
mere Cambridge growth.  Such mere Cambridge growth is doctrinally 
permissible even if the commensurability requirements of the disclosure 
doctrines require that thing-scope is fixed on the date a claim is filed.  
Thus, in theory, extrinsic-property AAT represents a type of AAT for 
which the fixation-growth paradox can be explained without contradiction.    
3.  Testing the Hypothesis: The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into 
Intrinsic- and Extrinsic-Property AAT 
The hypothesis put forward in the previous subsection is that courts 
might use the essentialist distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties to identify the properties that do and do not, respectively, define 
thing-types during thing construction.  If the distinction governed courts’ 
decisions during thing construction, one would expect bifurcated case law 
concerning the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  The inclusion of 
extrinsic-property AAT within a literal claim would generate only mere 
Cambridge growth in thing-scope.  Courts would therefore sanction the 
reach of literal thing-scope into extrinsic-property AAT without 
recognizing any legally relevant growth in thing-scope, i.e. even while 
embracing the fixation theory.  However, the inclusion of intrinsic-
property AAT within a literal claim would generate real growth in thing-
scope.  In this situation, thing construction would not mask the growth, and 
courts would be forced to either reach a verdict of noninfringement or 
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abandon the ex ante fixation of thing-scope.  In other words, extrinsic-
property AAT would result in a solution that sanctions both fixation and 
growth simultaneously, but intrinsic-property AAT would force courts to 
elect one of the incompatible fixation and growth theories. 
This subsection tests the hypothesis by comparing the Federal Circuit 
case law on the reach of literal claim scope into AAT with the case law 
that one would expect to result from courts’ adherence to the distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties during thing construction.  The 
comparison supports the conclusion that the hypothesis is at least half 
correct, and perhaps more than that.  On the one hand, extrinsic-property 
AAT always falls within the literal scope of a claim.127  Furthermore, 
courts and commentators never suggest that the claim’s thing-scope grows 
after the date of filing when it encompasses extrinsic-property AAT.  On 
the other hand, courts do not treat intrinsic-property AAT in a uniform 
manner.  They sanction the reach of literal claim scope into intrinsic-
property AAT in some instances, but not in others; they express concerns 
about ex post growth when literal claim scope reaches into intrinsic-
property AAT in some instances, but not in others.  Whether the structural 
essentialism that underlies the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties is dispositive in thing construction in cases involving intrinsic-
property AAT remains an open question. 
  a.  Literal Claims Always Encompass Extrinsic-Property AAT 
There are three recurring scenarios in which an improver N+1 invents 
a new extrinsic property for a thing already invented, disclosed, and 
claimed by an original inventor N: claims to combinations, new methods of 
making a claimed thing, and new methods of using a claimed thing.  In 
each scenario, courts always and without exception allow N’s claim to 
encompass N+1’s extrinsic-property AAT without even addressing the 
argument that the inclusion of such AAT within literal claim scope 
impermissibly expands the claim after the date of filing and violates the 
commensurateness requirement in the disclosure doctrines.  In other words, 
the fixation theory never stands in the way of courts’ inclusion of extrinsic-
property AAT within literal claim scope. 
After-arising combinations are the stuff of black letter law and 
introductory patent courses.  An inventor N invents and claims “the 
invention comprising A,” and an improver N+1 invents the after-arising 
combination A+B (which can be after-arising either because B is itself 
after-arising or because the combination of A and B is after-arising).128  
                                                                                                                          
127 But cf. infra note 135 (noting that a property that is conventionally viewed as an extrinsic 
property becomes an intrinsic property when a claim limitation expressly recites the property).  
128 N+1 can file either of two claims.  If she files a claim to the combination A+B, she generates a 
physical blocking patent; if she files a claim only to B (assuming that B itself is the invention), she 
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N’s claim always reads on N+1’s AAT; the presence of an “additional 
element,” B, in an accused device never negates the fact that N+1’s device 
infringes N’s claim.129  Another way of framing what occurs when N+1 
invents an after-arising combination is to note that N+1 has invented an 
after-arising extrinsic property for the thing invented, disclosed and 
claimed by N: N+1 has inventively attributed to the thing A the after-
arising property being used in combination with B.  This is an archetypal 
extrinsic property because A is the thing described by N’s claim and N+1’s 
invention specifies a relationship between A and B, a clearly distinct thing.  
The rule that N+1’s after-arising A+B always infringes N’s claim to “the 
invention comprising A” suggests that courts always overlook this 
extrinsic, relational property in determining the identity of the thing-types 
that comprise thing-scope.  Courts never pause to consider whether N’s 
claim is no longer commensurate with the disclosure at the time of filing 
when N’s claim grows in this fashion. 
The same doctrine that applies to after-arising combinations also 
applies to after-arising methods of making and using claimed things.  
When N+1 invents a new method of making a thing previously invented, 
disclosed, and claimed by N, N’s claim always, without exception, reads 
on the things made using N+1's after-arising process without running afoul 
of the commensurateness requirement.130  Here, N+1 makes a thing with 
the same intrinsic properties as the thing made by N but with a new 
extrinsic property—the property having been made by such-and-such an 
after-arising process.131  Similarly, when N+1 invents a new method of 
using a thing with all of the same intrinsic properties as a thing previously 
invented by N, N’s claim can also always read on N+1’s AAT without 
raising a commensurateness problem.132  The property being used for such-
and-such a purpose is an extrinsic property.  Two structurally identical 
                                                                                                                          
generates an economic blocking patent because she describes a physically distinct economic 
complement.  See supra note 66 (defining physical and economic blocking patents).  However, the 
effect of the physical and economic blocking patents on the expansion of the thing-scope of N’s claim 
is identical.  In both instances, the thing-scope of N’s claim to A includes at the time of infringement 
the thing A with the after-arising property being present in combination with B. 
129 Cf. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[A] pencil 
structurally infringing a patent claim would not become noninfringing when incorporated into a 
complex machine that limits or controls what the pencil can write.”). 
130 See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330–33 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(noting this rule in the written description requirement); id. at 1334–35 (noting this rule in the 
enablement requirement); cf. Vanguard Prods. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 234 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the fixed meaning-scope of literal claims encompasses things made by 
after-arising processes).  
131 It is not absurd to talk about the property being made by a particular process as a property.  Cf. 
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 118–19 (arguing that “seeing something from the point of view of its origins” 
is a distinct perspective on the world).  
132 See B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding that a claim to 
an improved sparkplug reads on sparkplugs used in airplanes that were developed after the sparkplug 
claim had been filed). 
 532 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:493 
molecules of chemical X are treated as duplicates even if they are being 
put to different uses.  The fact that the useful functions of a thing-token are 
extrinsic properties also explains why a species that is patentable over an 
already issued genus claim because of the discovery of an unexpected use 
for the species routinely falls within the scope of the genus claim without 
causing an outcry that the genus claim is somehow expanded by the 
inclusion of AAT.133  The species claimant has merely discovered a 
nonobvious, extrinsic property of the already invented, disclosed and 
claimed object. 
Thus, at least with respect to extrinsic-property AAT, the hypothesis 
that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties governs 
courts’ decisions during thing construction is consistent with the Federal 
Circuit’s case law on the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  The per se 
inclusion of extrinsic-property AAT within literal claim scope suggests 
that courts performing thing construction in these cases are firmly under 
the sway of a structural essentialism pertaining to the nature of what things 
are.134  Courts seem to view things as being defined by their internal 
structures and nothing more.  Extrinsic properties do not appear to 
contribute to the identity of thing-types; courts never seem to divide what 
they intuitively perceive to be a unitary thing-type into distinct thing-types 
with reference to extrinsic properties.135  Things that are after-arising only 
in the sense that they have after-arising extrinsic properties are readily 
viewed as duplicates of the things in existence at the time of filing.  
                                                                                                                          
133 See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 806 (S.D. Tex. 1983), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“A subsequent species invention, even if unobvious and hence patentable over an earlier generic 
invention, . . . does not require restriction of the literal scope of claims to the generic invention so as to 
exclude the later species.”). 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 116–18 (noting that the distinction between the intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties of a thing rests on a structural or physical essentialism). 
135 There is an exception to this rule.  Properties that are conventionally viewed as extrinsic 
become relevant when the conventional framing of the things in question is narrowed by the claim 
language.  A conventionally extrinsic property can become intrinsic by expressly reframing the amount 
of stuff that comprises the thing.  See supra text accompanying note 115 (noting that the physical 
framing of the thing in question can affect whether a property is intrinsic or extrinsic).  Properties that 
are by convention extrinsic can be made intrinsic and relevant to both meaning-scope and the identity 
of things if they are expressly listed as limitations in the text of the claim.  If a patent simply claims 
“paper,” then the property being in a computer printer paper tray is an extrinsic property of the 
claimed paper.  However, if the patent claims more specifically “paper in a computer printer paper 
tray,” then the property being in a computer printer paper tray is an intrinsic property of the claimed 
things because the things under consideration are paper/printer-tray pairings.  Similarly, a product-by-
process claim can transform the conventionally extrinsic property having been made by such-and-such 
a process into one that matters to thing-scope.  See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 
F.2d 834, 846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[P]rocess terms in product-by-process claims serve as limitations 
in determining infringement.”).  But see Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 
1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they are not 
limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”).  In the same vein, the function of 
an object is not extrinsic to the things described by a claim reciting the object being used in a particular 
fashion. 
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Growth in the number of extrinsic properties that things described by the 
claim possess is not understood to trigger an expansion in the metric of 
thing-scope relevant to the commensurability analyses of the disclosure 
doctrines.  The post-filing growth in thing-scope that does occur when a 
claim encompasses extrinsic-property AAT is dismissed as mere 
Cambridge growth. 
Of course, the fact that courts routinely allow extrinsic-property AAT 
to fall within literal claim scope does not definitively prove that courts 
overlook the extrinsic properties of a thing during thing construction.  The 
use of the growth theory is also consistent with the holdings in cases 
involving extrinsic-property AAT.  However, the growth theory does not 
fit well with the way in which these cases are most commonly understood.  
Claims to combinations, new methods of making a claimed thing, and new 
methods of using a claimed thing are viewed as making the things 
described by a claim more valuable, but they are not viewed as increasing 
the number of things described.  It is commonly believed that literal claims 
can encompass extrinsic-property AAT without undergoing any growth in 
thing-scope.136  
  b.  Literal Claims Sometimes Exclude Intrinsic-Property AAT 
There is no symmetry between the holdings of cases involving 
extrinsic-property AAT and the holdings of cases involving intrinsic-
property AAT.  Courts do not have a per se rule of exclusion that prevents 
literal claim scope from reaching into intrinsic-property AAT.  Rather, the 
cases in which courts confront allegedly infringing intrinsic-property AAT 
are a mixed bag.     
Adhering to the fixation theory, some courts hold that literal claim 
scope cannot encompass intrinsic-property AAT as a matter of law because 
the commensurability requirement of the disclosure doctrines fixes claim 
scope on the date of filing and the growth required for claim scope to 
encompass the AAT is incompatible with this fixation.137  Yet, not all 
courts insist that intrinsic-property AAT does not literally infringe.  Many 
courts conclude that literal claim scope can encompass intrinsic-property 
AAT.  Abandoning the fixation theory and applying the growth theory, 
courts sometimes expressly recognize that inclusion of intrinsic-property 
AAT within the literal scope of a claim means that the thing-scope of a 
claim must grow over time.  In these cases, courts openly sanction a 
                                                                                                                          
136 See e.g., Lemley, supra note 66, at 1009 (noting that a claim can read on AAT if either (a) 
“enablement is tested as of the time the original inventor files for a patent” and thus a growth theory is 
adopted or (b) the AAT “consists of additions to the basic structure” or involves “new and 
unanticipated uses of [the patented] product”).  
137 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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growth theory for thing-scope.138  However, courts also sometimes allow 
literal claim scope to encompass intrinsic-property AAT without 
recognizing that this result requires post-filing growth in thing-scope.  For 
example, consider again the easy cases of infringement outlined in the 
new-materiality and new-geometry coffee sleeve hypotheticals.139  
Materiality and internal geometry are core examples of intrinsic 
properties,140 so the allegedly infringing technologies are intrinsic-property 
AAT.  It is unclear whether courts believe that a verdict of infringement in 
these easy cases does not challenge the fixation of the claim’s thing-scope 
on the date of filing or whether courts believe that post-filing growth exists 
but that such growth is uncontroversial under the growth theory.  It is thus 
unclear whether the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties 
governs courts’ decisions during thing construction in cases involving 
intrinsic-property AAT.   
The diversity in the case law can be explained by either of two stories.  
The first story presumes that the structural essentialism underlying the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties holds sway during 
thing construction in intrinsic-property AAT cases just like it does in 
extrinsic-property AAT cases.  In other words, it presumes courts always 
recognize that inclusion of intrinsic-property AAT within the literal scope 
of a claim creates real growth in thing-scope and thus unhinges the claim’s 
thing-scope from the thing-scope of the claim on the date of filing.  To 
explain the courts’ pattern of sometimes, but not always, sanctioning the 
reach of literal claim scope into intrinsic-property AAT, this first story 
relies on the courts oscillating between the fixation and growth theories in 
their administration of the disclosure doctrines.141  Here, the conventional 
view that fixation and growth in literal claim scope are incompatible 
                                                                                                                          
138 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  In fact, all of the cases in which courts expressly 
raise the growth theory as an alternative to the fixation theory are cases involving intrinsic-property 
AAT.  This observation is simply a logical corollary of the point made in the previous subsection, 
namely that the nature of extrinsic properties as properties not tied up with what makes a thing the 
thing itself means that courts and commentators do not view fixation and growth as incompatible when 
extrinsic-property AAT is at issue. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 72–75.  
140 See supra text accompanying notes 94–96 (defining intrinsic properties).  Coffee sleeves made 
of different materials and geometries are not strict duplicates, see supra text accompanying notes 104–
06 (contrasting duplicates with indiscernibles), and the change required to transform the materiality or 
shape of a coffee sleeve is real change, see supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (contrasting real 
change with mere Cambridge change). 
141 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the fixation 
and growth theories in the disclosure doctrines).  Courts’ pattern in the intrinsic-property AAT cases 
may also be influenced by the conflict between the fixation and growth theories in meaning-scope.  See 
supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.  Courts may be sanctioning the growth theory as it pertains 
to thing-scope, but both presuming that growth in thing-scope entails growth in meaning-scope and 
adhering to a fixation theory as it pertains to meaning-scope.  Cf. infra Part IV (arguing that the 
meaning of meaning determines whether the fixation of meaning-scope entails the fixation of thing-
scope).  
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prevails.   
In contrast, a second story suggests that courts are not always under the 
sway of structural essentialism during thing construction and that they use 
some other principle to set the granularity of things.  Perhaps judges do not 
always feel bound to make all of the intrinsic properties of a thing relevant 
to the identity of a thing-type.  Courts may overlook selected intrinsic 
properties during thing construction and thereby sanction the reach of a 
claim with a fixed thing-scope into intrinsic-property AAT.  Courts may 
treat a property that should be intrinsic-property AAT in an essentialist 
worldview as though it were extrinsic-property AAT.  That is, they may 
generate a category of ersatz extrinsic-property AAT, placing tokens of 
things with distinct intrinsic properties into the same conceptual thing-type 
basket.  This second story suggests that courts use a one-way ratchet to 
adjust the granularity of things away from its essentialist mooring during 
thing construction: the existence of ersatz extrinsic properties means that 
thing-types can be coarser than the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties suggests they should be, but the absence of ersatz 
intrinsic properties means that thing-types cannot be made finer than the 
distinction suggests.  This story also offers a both-and solution, explaining 
how courts can transform what should be real growth in thing-scope into 
mere Cambridge growth so as to achieve both the ex ante fixation of thing-
scope and the inclusion of intrinsic-property AAT within the scope of a 
literal claim. 
Clearly, it is impossible to know for certain which of these stories 
explains the mixed bag of holdings and rationales in cases involving 
allegations that literal claim scope reaches into intrinsic-property AAT.142  
If a court has a sense of what the outcome of a case should be, the court 
can either oscillate between the fixation and growth theories or generate 
ersatz extrinsic-properties to achieve the desired outcome.143  Given the 
dominance of the fixation and growth theories in contemporary discourse 
about patent protection,144 the only point that can be made here is that the 
option of policy-driven ersatz extrinsic properties should not be 
categorically disregarded.  Courts may use thing construction as a policy 
lever.145  They may ratchet down the granularity of things from the 
essentialist mooring provided by the distinction between intrinsic and 
                                                                                                                          
142 A thesis about which of these two stories is descriptively more accurate would require at least 
a more detailed descriptive analysis of case law and most likely an entirely different type of analysis 
aimed at understanding the unexpressed cognitive processes of judges. 
143 Another way of stating this fact is that the court can use either oscillation between the fixation 
and growth theories or thing construction as a policy lever.  See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra 
note 16, at 1640 (noting a court’s discretion to use doctrinal policy levers). 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 3–11 (introducing the dominant growth and fixation 
theories). 
145 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1640 (noting a court’s discretion to use 
doctrinal policy levers). 
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extrinsic properties so as to achieve a both-and solution to the fixation-
growth paradox and shape the reach of literal claim scope into intrinsic-
property AAT. 
In fact, the notion that courts generate ersatz extrinsic properties and 
treat real growth in thing-scope as though it were mere Cambridge growth 
is arguably better at explaining intuitions about patent protection in at least 
some situations in which literal claim scope reaches into intrinsic-property 
AAT.  For example, consider again the hypothetical claim to “paper” and 
an allegedly infringing sheet of paper with the property being dyed with 
after-arising chemical X.146  Consider two variants of this hypothetical: one 
in which the after-arising chemical alters the chemical structure of the 
paper, incorporating itself into the molecular structure of the paper’s fibers, 
and one in which the after-arising chemical simply coats the exterior of the 
pre-existing paper.  The latter, “coating” variant of the hypothetical is a 
clear example of extrinsic-property AAT.  It is akin to the type of AAT 
generated by a combination claim: the AAT is simply the same old paper 
disclosed in the specification of the patent claiming “paper” that has been 
put into a new relation with a later-developed technology.  Its inclusion in 
the claim to “paper” generates only mere Cambridge growth in thing-
scope, and such growth is always masked through thing construction.  In 
contrast, the former, “chemically integral” variant is a clear example of 
intrinsic-property AAT.  According to a worldview dominated by 
structural essentialism, the AAT is a thing that is distinct from the things 
disclosed in the patent claiming “paper.”  Yet, despite the fact that the 
former is extrinsic-property AAT and the latter is intrinsic-property AAT, 
courts may not make a sharp conceptual distinction between the two 
variants.  To the extent that the difference between the two variants is 
viewed as insubstantial, the case for believing that courts do sometimes use 
ersatz extrinsic-property AAT becomes stronger.  Sometimes, what things 
are structurally does not seem to matter.  This perception suggests that 
thing construction is not always governed by the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic properties and that thing construction is at least 
sometimes used as a policy lever for adjusting the granularity of things and 
shaping the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. 
IV.  THE MEANING OF MEANING 
The previous Part demonstrated how courts can construct things so as 
to fix thing-scope on the date of filing and still allow literal claims to grow 
after filing so as to encompass AAT.  This Part explores a second, and 
analytically independent, mechanism through which courts can achieve a 
both-and solution of fixation and growth.  By adopting the appropriate 
                                                                                                                          
146 See supra text accompanying notes 84, 90, 126. 
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definition for meaning, courts can sanction play between thing-scope and 
meaning-scope: even if the thing-scope of a claim grows after the date of 
filing, meaning-scope may remain fixed on the date of filing.147 
Part IV.A demonstrates that the meaning of meaning is ambiguous.  
Denotational meaning, or reference, derives from relationships between 
words and things in the world, whereas ideational meaning, or sense, 
derives from relationships between words.148  Part IV.B demonstrates the 
practical implications of this ambiguity.  The court’s choice of how to 
define the meaning of meaning in claim construction determines whether a 
claim with a meaning-scope fixed on the date of filing can literally 
encompass AAT that expands the claim’s thing-scope.  Because 
denotational meaning links words to things, courts that stabilize 
denotational meaning on the date of filing necessarily stabilize both 
meaning-scope and thing-scope on the date of filing in the same fell 
swoop.  Denotational meaning forces courts to adopt either the fixation 
theory or the growth theory: if AAT requires a post-filing expansion in 
thing-scope to infringe, either the AAT cannot literally infringe (i.e. 
fixation trumps) or the meaning of the claim cannot be fixed on the date of 
filing (i.e. growth trumps).  However, a court that stabilizes ideational 
meaning on the date of filing can reach a both-and solution.  Ideational 
meaning fixes only word-to-word relationships and thus sanctions play 
between the meaning-scope and thing-scope of a claim.  Ideationally 
defined meaning-scope can remain steadfastly fixed on the date of filing, 
even as thing-scope expands over time to encompass AAT.  Part IV.C 
concludes with a brief overview of the situations in which courts actually 
use ideational and denotational meaning in claim construction. 
                                                                                                                          
147 Thing construction and the meaning of meaning are analytically independent mechanisms for 
resolving the fixation-growth paradox without logical contradiction.  The previous Part demonstrated 
that thing construction achieves this end by masking growth in thing-scope.  Extrinsic-property AAT, 
both essential and ersatz, can fall within the literal scope of a claim because the mere Cambridge 
growth in thing-scope that such AAT triggers upon its inclusion simply does not expand the claim’s 
thing-scope when measured with the legally sanctioned metric for a thing-type.  See generally supra 
Part III.  This Part investigates a distinct and logically subsequent question.  It assumes that the 
inclusion of AAT within the scope of a literal claim expands thing-scope; it assumes that thing 
construction has not been used to achieve a result of simultaneous fixation and growth.  Starting from 
this point, it queries whether the expansion of thing-scope entails the expansion of meaning-scope or 
whether alternatively meaning-scope can remain fixed even as thing-scope expands. 
148 Margaret Radin’s work demonstrates that patent lawyers can gain insight by bringing the 
philosophy of language to bear on the mechanics of peripheral claims.  Margaret Jane Radin, The 
Linguistic Turn in Patent Law (2005) (draft on file with Connecticut Law Review) (juxtaposing basic 
patent issues with basic issues in the philosophy of language); see also Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of 
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 50–52 (2000) (invoking Wittgenstein’s views of 
language as an activity that is performed in a community to argue against a “hypertextualist” theory of 
claim construction); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 
83–105 (2006) (advocating a “linguistics-based approach to claim construction”).  However, the 
ambiguity in the meaning of meaning discussed in this Part is new to the patent literature.   
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A.  The Ambiguity in the Meaning of Meaning 
Over a decade ago in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court identified two steps within the process of determining 
whether the language of a patent claim describes a thing-token, and it 
assigned each step to a different party.149  It assigned claim construction, 
the interpretation of the word meaning of the language, to judges, and it 
reserved infringement, or the determination of whether the meaning of the 
language encompasses the allegedly infringing things, for the jury.150  With 
the power to perform claim construction in the hands of the judges, patent 
courts and commentators have understandably focused, ever since 
Markman, on identifying an appropriate methodology for claim 
construction.  In large part, this question has led to a heated battle over the 
relative importance of the contextual use of words in patent specifications 
and the words’ dictionary definitions.151  
The question that this subsection addresses and that courts face when 
defining the meaning of meaning is not this common question.152  Here, 
meaning is not dealt with as a noun in the sense of the generality or 
specificity of the semantic content of a particular word or phrase.  Rather, 
it is the nature of meaning as a verb that is at issue.  The question is not 
what descriptive language means but how it means.  How does a claim 
term achieve semantic content?  This subsection argues that the meaning of 
meaning in this verbal form is ambiguous.  Denotational and ideational 
theories of meaning—alternatively described as reference and sense, 
respectively—both offer plausible interpretations of the mechanism 
through which descriptive language achieves meaning.153  
                                                                                                                          
149 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). 
150 Id. at 384, 391. 
151 The Federal Circuit confronted this issue head-on in Phillips v. AWH Corp., but Phillips did 
not eliminate the confusion.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  For an 
empirical take on this methodological question before Phillips, see generally Wagner & Petherbridge, 
supra note 24. 
152 However, the relative weight afforded to the specification and dictionaries can also influence 
the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  See, e.g., Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 
F.3d 870, 896–98 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of a denotational claim 
construction in part because “the preferred, proper sources of interpretation [are] the disclosure, 
technical dictionaries, prior art patents, and expert testimony” and the disclosure necessarily only 
conveys possible things accessible to the PHOSITA at the time of filing).  The definition of meaning 
addressed here is also distinct from the construction required to determine the size of the “chunk” of 
text of a patent claim that should constitute a single limitation.  See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 41–46 (2005). 
153 Variations on this distinction have a long and pedigreed history that is generally traced to 
Gottlob Frege’s 1892 essay On Sense and Reference.  TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
WRITINGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 56 (Peter Geach & Max Black eds., 1952).  However, the linguistic and 
philosophical terminology used in this Article is not used by all scholars of language in the same way.  
Cf. MICHAEL DEVITT & KIM STERELNY, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 34 (1987) (“One should be on the lookout for different technical usages 
among semanticists.”); JOHN LYONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 7–8 (1995) 
(discussing the regimentation and extension of meaning in linguistic metalanguage).  There is no 
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1.  Denotational Meaning  
A denotational theory of meaning posits that descriptive word 
meanings follow from a relationship between a word and the objects or 
actions that the word describes.  Denotationally speaking, words “can be 
readily defined by identifying what they stand for” in the world.154  
Denotational meaning is often used interchangeably with the notion of 
reference.  Reference is the link between language, our medium of 
communication, and the objective world, that about which communication 
occurs.155  “Reference is concerned with designating entities in the world 
by linguistic means.”156  (To mimic the language commonly employed to 
claim mechanical inventions in patent practice, “the distal term of the 
relation of reference”157 is an object, and the proximal term is language.)  
From the perspective of a scholar of language, reference addresses “how 
language ‘hooks on to’ the extralinguistic world.”158  In sum, a descriptive 
expression achieves denotational meaning because it refers to a generic 
class of objects or a set of thing-types.159 
In the terminology of logic, a follower of a denotational theory of 
meaning believes that words stand for the term’s extension, that is, the 
class of objects to which the term applies.160  The extension of a term is 
“[i]ts range as measured by the number of objects which it . . . contains 
under it.”161  To adopt an extensional approach to meaning is “to attempt to 
correlate expressions in language with aspects of the world.”162  
Although intuitive in its go-for-the-jugular approach to meaning, an 
advocate of a strictly denotational theory of meaning that localizes 
meaning in the link between descriptive words and real-world objects must 
grapple with a problem arising from the empirically limited number of 
objects that exist in the world around us.  There is the problem of empty 
                                                                                                                          
universal lexicon for discussing the meaning of meaning.  
154 LYONS, supra note 153, at 75. 
155 Some linguists distinguish reference and denotation to allow the former to address the 
“utterance-dependent” part of an expression’s meaning.  See LYONS, supra note 153, at 79; cf. DEVITT 
& STERELNY, supra note 153, at 34 (noting different uses of the term ‘refer’ among British and 
American philosophers). 
156 CRUSE, supra note 26, at 305.  A more cautious theory of reference questions the mind’s 
access to an “objective world” independent from language-based conceptual structures.  Id. at 306; 
DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 199–200; cf. LYONS, supra note 153, at 324–25 (discussing 
“the viewpoint of naive realism, according to which the ontological structure of the world is objectively 
independent both of perception and cognition and also of language . . . .”).  
157 CRUSE, supra note 26, at 306. 
158 Id. at 301; LYONS, supra note 153, at 76. 
159 Patent claims use language to achieve generic reference, or reference to a class of objects, 
rather than definite or indefinite reference to a particular object in the class.  See CRUSE, supra note 26, 
at 306–12 (distinguishing definite, indefinite, and generic reference).  
160 K. CODELL CARTER, A FIRST COURSE IN LOGIC 71 (2004); CRUSE, supra note 26, at 21–22; 
LYONS, supra note 153, at 301. 
161 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 8b). 
162 CRUSE, supra note 26, at 21. 
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terms.163  Many descriptive words and phrases have meaning, yet there are 
no objects in the tangible world to which they connect.  “Unicorn” is not a 
meaningless term.  Yet, if extension in the world around us were equated 
with meaning through reference, the meaningfulness of “unicorn” would 
be in jeopardy because it cannot obtain its meaning by standing for an 
object in our world.  There is also the problem of terms that refer to 
coextensive sets of objects but that do not always have interchangeable 
meanings.  If the extension of a descriptive word in the actual world is the 
sole determinate of meaning and two terms refer to the same objects, 
explanations of why the two terms that refer to coextensive sets of objects 
are not completely interchangeable are difficult to come by.  For example, 
“[t]he property of being human and the property of being a featherless 
biped have (we may presume) the same extension, yet they are distinct 
properties.”164 
To address these problems, some proponents of denotation and 
reference as the locus of descriptive meaning “enrich ontology (our view 
of the sorts of things that exist)” and introduce the notion of possible 
worlds.165  According to possible-world theorists, speakers inhabit the 
actual world, but worlds other than this actual world may be at the distal 
end of reference.  “We begin with the idea of the totality of the possible 
worlds across which all of the genuine possibilities . . . are represented.  
One of these possible worlds—the actual world—is special, closer to our 
hearts and distinguished somehow from the others that are ‘merely’ 
possible.”166  The meaning of a generic descriptive expression is then 
achieved by quantifying over all possible worlds and identifying the set of 
objects to which the word refers in our actual world and other possible 
worlds as well.  “The simplest plan is to take a property just as the set of all 
its instances—all of them, this- or other-worldly alike.  Thus the property 
of being a donkey comes out as the set of all donkeys, the donkeys of other 
worlds along with the donkeys of ours.”167  Thus, the word “unicorn” has 
                                                                                                                          
163 See, e.g., DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 27–28 (discussing the term “James Bond” 
as an “empty name” that does not have a real-world referent). 
164 JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 9–10 (2002); see also LEWIS, supra note 106, at 50 (noting 
that the property of having a heart and having a kidney are different properties although both properties 
refer to the same set of creatures in our world); LYONS, supra note 153, at 300–01 (discussing 
referential opacity).  
165 DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 30–32; see also LYONS, supra note 153, at 230–31 
(presenting “possible worlds” as a useful concept for dealing with the problems created by referential 
opacity and terms that do not denote anything).  Systems of thought employing possibilia may involve 
either the quantification of possibilities over entire worlds or the quantification over possible 
individuals in a world.  See LEWIS, supra note 106, at 8 (“As other worlds are alternative possibilities 
for an entire world, so the parts of other worlds are alternative possibilities for lesser individuals.”).  
This Article uses the rhetoric of possible worlds and individuals/objects interchangeably. 
166 DIVERS, supra note 164, at 5. 
167 LEWIS, supra note 106, at 50–51; see also DIVERS, supra note 164, at 32 (“[Possible-world 
discourse] may be applied to serve . . . the aim of ontological identification in which [it] articulates the 
identification of some familiar kind of entity as a certain kind of construct out of possible worlds.”); id. 
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meaning because unicorns do exist at some non-actual, possible worlds, 
and “divergence in the extension at some possible world—where there are 
featherless bipeds that are not human—ensures that being human is not the 
same property as being a featherless biped.”168  In sum, denotational 
meaning is a set-theoretical construction comprised of possible things, both 
this-worldly and other-worldly. 
2.  Ideational Meaning  
Where denotation lodges the mechanism of meaning in a link between 
words and things beyond the realm of linguistics, sense posits that meaning 
is first and foremost an affair of the human mind.169  Sense supports an 
ideational or mentalistic theory of meaning—one proposing that “the 
meaning of an expression is the idea, or concept, associated with it in the 
mind of anyone who knows and understands the expression”—rather than 
the referential or denotational theory discussed previously—one proposing 
that “the meaning of an expression is what it refers to . . . or stands for.”170  
Where denotation involves “word-to-world” links, sense involves 
“word-to-word” links.171  The ideational meaning of an expression is 
determined by the links the expression has with one or more other 
expressions “in a complex multi-dimensional network.”172  The links 
specify different relations such as “is a kind of, is a part of, [or] is used for” 
between the expressions at the nodes.173  For example, the node “bachelor” 
is defined by a relationship of hyponymy—or entailment—with the nodes 
“unmarried,” “adult,” and “man,”174 and “red” is defined in part by a 
relationship of incompatibility with “blue.”175  Sense is sometimes thought 
of as dictionary meaning because dictionaries define words by specifying 
their relationships to other words.176 
                                                                                                                          
at 51 (“The properties . . . are all and only the subsets of the set of all individuals.”).  
168 DIVERS, supra note 164, at 10.  This still leaves the problem of words that are different in 
important ways yet that describe coextensive sets in all possible worlds, like “triangular” and 
“trilateral.”  Because the economic effect of patent law depends entirely on thing-scope at the end of 
the day, see supra text accompanying note 30, this problem is not a pressing one here. 
169 See CRUSE, supra note 26, at 22 (depicting intensional meaning as a mental representation). 
170 LYONS, supra note 153, at 40. 
171 Id. at 101.  
172 CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127; see also LYONS, supra note 153, at 80 (“The sense of an 
expression may be defined as the set, or network, of sense-relations that hold between it and other 
expressions of the same language.”).  A modified formulation of sense locates the meaning-giving 
relationships not between words but between concepts.  See CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127–29 
(discussing word-concept mapping).  Although the difference between the expression- and concept-
based approaches to sense has important implications for the relationship between language and 
thought, it is not relevant to the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. 
173 CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127. 
174 LYONS, supra note 153, at 125–26, 128; see also CRUSE, supra note 26, at 150–51 (noting that 
“apple is a hyponym of fruit”). 
175 LYONS, supra note 153, at 128; see also CRUSE, supra note 26, at 165 (noting that properties 
that are incompatibles “cannot be simultaneously present”). 
176 LYONS, supra note 153, at 77–78. 
 542 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:493 
Again borrowing from the terminology of logic, sense offers meaning 
to a term by invoking the term’s intension—the set of abstract properties 
by virtue of which any particular object is placed in the term’s extension.177  
In the schema of an ideationalist, properties are not reducible to 
quantifications over possible worlds.  They are abstract entities in their 
own right that can be subject to independent semantic analysis. 
B.  Claim Construction and the Historical Fixation of Meaning-Scope 
In everyday communication, people get by fine with the ambiguity in 
the meaning of meaning.  Both denotation and sense provide passable 
accounts of how descriptive language operates.  “There is not an unfamiliar 
tradeoff . . . between nonfactual possibles and intensions . . . given either, 
we may be able to construct the other or to do the work that was supposed 
to be done by talking about the other.”178  Nor are the two mutually 
exclusive.  A scholar of sense need not “deny that there are (presumably 
important) relations between linguistic forms and extralinguistic reality”; 
she may pragmatically “assum[e] that the most direct connections of 
linguistic forms . . . are with conceptual structures, and until these are 
sorted out, there is little hope of making progress with the more indirect 
links with the outside world.”179  
Claim construction, however, is not everyday communication.  Claim 
construction artificially fixes meaning on the historical date on which a 
claim is made.180  This difference from everyday communication 
transforms the difference between ideational and denotational meaning into 
a difference that makes a difference in the ability of a claim with a fixed 
meaning-scope to encompass AAT that must expand thing-scope if it is to 
infringe.   
Fixation of denotational meaning concretizes word-to-world 
relationships.  It defines meaning-scope in terms of thing-scope.  Courts fix 
meaning-scope by fixing the extension of the set of things to which the 
claim refers.  Courts that construe claims denotationally must choose 
between the fixation and growth theories: either meaning is fixed on the 
date of filing or meaning can grow in the manner required for a claim to 
encompass AAT that expands thing-scope.   
In contrast, fixation of ideational meaning operates only on a 
conceptual plane and rigidifies only word-to-word relationships.  It fixes 
only the intension of the set of things that comprises thing-scope or the 
                                                                                                                          
177 CARTER, supra note 160, at 71; LYONS, supra note 153, at 81; see also CRUSE, supra note 26, 
at 22. 
178 Robert Merrihew Adams, Theories of Actuality, in THE POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 190, 207 
(Michael J. Loux ed., 1979). 
179 CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127; see also DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 32. 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
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criteria by which inclusion or exclusion from the set is determined.  
Critically, the fixation of ideational meaning of a claim does not require 
fixation of the set of things to which the claim refers.  Thus, what is at 
stake in the choice between the fixation of ideational and denotational 
meaning is the ability of thing-scope to expand along a progressive 
dimension throughout the term of the patent. 
1.  Denotational Meaning in Claim Construction 
Because denotational meaning is based on reference or word-to-world 
relationships, a court using a denotational theory of meaning in claim 
construction must identify a set of possible things to which the claim refers 
in order to give meaning to the claim.181  More specifically, to determine 
the denotational meaning that the claim language has to the technologically 
trained and time-bound PHOSITA rather than to someone else, a court 
must tailor the set to reflect both the PHOSITA’s technological training 
and her position in history.182  Courts achieve the tailoring required by the 
technological and temporal biases in different ways. 
The PHOSITA’s technological bias makes her picky or selective in the 
set of possible things that she includes in the extension of a descriptive 
limitation.  The PHOSITA sorts through the infinite number of possible 
thing-types that she can imagine, labeling some as described and thus 
within the set, and others as not described and thus excluded from the set.  
For example, to return to the coffee sleeve hypotheticals,183 the 
technological bias suggests that “an insulating band” for the PHOSITA of 
coffee drinking technology means something different than “an insulating 
band” does for the PHOSITA of electrical engineering.  The coffee 
drinking PHOSITA would include a commonly available band made from 
material that is thermally but not electrically insulating, but the PHOSITA 
of electrical engineering would exclude it. 
The temporal bias does not make the PHOSITA picky with respect to 
the possible things that she consciously decides to either include within or 
exclude from the claim’s extension.  Rather, it makes the PHOSITA 
ignorant of all of the possible things that incorporate AAT and that would, 
if they were to infringe, expand thing-scope.  Because of her ordinariness 
                                                                                                                          
181 See supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining denotational meaning).  Procedurally, a purely denotational 
theory of meaning is inimical to the U.S. Supreme Court’s command in Markman that claim 
construction is in the province of judges but infringement is a task for juries.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 149–50.  If denotational meaning is a set of possible things, then the determination 
of meaning entails the determination of infringement.  However, courts can avoid this Markman 
problem by implementing a denotational theory of meaning by determining the ideational meaning of 
the claim and then subtracting any AAT that expands the claim’s thing-scope after the date of filing.  
See infra note 193 and accompanying text.  
182 See supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (discussing the PHOSITA’s technological and 
temporal biases).   
183 See supra text accompanying notes 72–75. 
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and average level of creativity, the PHOSITA immersed in a historical 
context cannot conceive of or imagine such AAT.  In possible world 
discourse, the notion of possible things that lie beyond the grasp of an 
individual is conveyed through the term of art accessibility.  Accessibility 
uses the standpoint of the actual world of a particular speaker or thinker to 
restrict the set of possible worlds over which the quantification of sets 
occurs.184  It has a wide variety of applications, but, as relevant to the task 
at hand, it is responsible for making people who sort identically to 
associate different extensions with a claim when they quantify over 
different sets of possible worlds.185  The position of the PHOSITA within 
her own world—the world of the date on which a claim is filed—means 
that there are possible things that are inaccessible to her yet accessible to 
today’s PHOSITA.  Even though today’s and yesterday’s PHOSITA sort 
possible things in an identical manner, the two PHOSITAs might reach 
different denotational meanings because today’s PHOSITA can access, and 
thus sort through, a larger group of possible worlds and things.  To use a 
common example from patent opinions that discuss AAT, Velcro® is a 
possible thing that was inaccessible to a PHOSITA in the art of mechanical 
fasteners prior to its invention.186  The after-arising coffee sleeves 
fabricated with nonobvious materials and folded in nonobvious geometries 
are also, by definition, inaccessible possible things in all of their 
particularities to the time-bound PHOSITA of coffee sleeves on the date 
the claim to “paper” is filed.187 
2.  Ideational Meaning in Claim Construction 
A court using an ideational theory of meaning in claim construction 
views the claim language as a node in a network of other expressions.  To 
define the meaning of a particular claim term, the court must identify the 
inter-nodal links that tie an expression into the network of other 
expressions.188  Unlike denotational meaning, ideational meaning 
accommodates the PHOSITA’s technological and temporal biases in the 
same manner—by tweaking links.189  
To return to the coffee sleeve hypotheticals, the meaning of 
“encircling” for everyone might be defined and fixed by its complex 
                                                                                                                          
184 See DIVERS, supra note 164, at 8; LEWIS, supra note 106, at 7.  
185 See LYONS, supra note 153, at 233 (“[S]peakers are constrained by certain kinds of 
accessibility in their selection, or construction, of the possible worlds that they refer to . . . .”).  To say 
that the PHOSITAs sort identically is the same as saying that they give the claim language the same 
ideational meaning.  See infra notes 192–93 and accompanying text (noting that at the time of filing 
there is no practical distinction between denotational and ideational meaning).  
186 Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
187 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (presenting the coffee sleeve hypotheticals). 
188 See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining ideational meaning). 
189 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (discussing the PHOSITA’s technological and 
temporal biases).   
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relationship of sometimes, but not always, being a kind of “hollow 
cylinder” or “ring.”190  The limitation “insulating” might be defined and 
fixed in part by incompatibility links with the concepts of “conductive” or 
“transmitting” for everyone.191  The technological bias, however, suggests 
that “insulating” for the PHOSITA of coffee drinking technology still 
means something slightly different than “insulating” does for the 
PHOSITA of structural engineering.  The latter’s network contains 
prominent links between the expression/concept “insulating” and other 
expressions/concepts like “building fire” and “boiler explosion,” whereas 
the former’s network links “insulating” to “pain” and “fingertips.”  
To give the PHOSITA her temporal bias and to head off the possibility 
of change in meaning over time, a court freezes the network on the date the 
claim is filed.  For example, the ideational definition of “insulating” to the 
PHOSITA of coffee drinking technology might become more restrictive 
after the date on which the claim is filed if scientific progress were to 
shockingly reveal that exposing our fingertips to even slight increases in 
temperature over extended periods of time has significant adverse medical 
consequences.  The concept of “adverse medical consequences” would 
have a more prominent link in the network of linkages that define 
“insulating” after this revelation than it did before, and the generality of the 
semantic meaning of “insulating” to the PHOSITA would decrease over 
time.  Such shifts in the temporally and technologically advanced 
PHOSITA’s inter-lexical network must be ignored in fixing the meaning of 
“insulating” on the date the claim was made.  
3.  The Stakes: The Progressive Dimension of Literal Claim Scope 
If the same set of things infringed ideationally and denotationally 
construed claims, then an inquiry into the theory of meaning that courts use 
during claim construction might be of academic interest, but it would not 
be of economic interest to patent owners.  However, the decision of a court 
to use one theory of meaning or the other has significant economic 
implications for patent owners over time.  What is at stake in the choice 
between ideational and denotational meaning is, and is nothing more than, 
the reach of literal claim scope into possible things that were inaccessible 
to the PHOSITA at the time of filing.  
At the time of filing, there is no practical import to the distinction 
between denotational and ideational meaning.  At this time, the notion of 
inaccessible possible things is irrelevant.  Inaccessible possible things 
cannot infringe because they do not exist in the actual world.  The 
denotational and ideational variants of meaning-scope thus pick out an 
identical set of things at that time.  This equivalence follows from the fact 
                                                                                                                          
190 Cf. supra note 174 and accompanying text (giving an example of entailment).  
191 Cf. supra note 175 and accompanying text (giving an example of incompatibility). 
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that the intension of a term is by definition a function for determining the 
term’s extension.192  Only objects possessing the properties comprising the 
term’s intension are included in the term’s extension.193  However, as time 
progresses and AAT is discovered after the date of filing, an important 
difference between ideational and denotational meaning develops. 
By equating meaning with a set of accessible possible things, 
denotation fixes historical reference and extension as part and parcel of its 
fixation of historical meaning.  Membership in the set of possible things 
within the extension of a term is closed when meaning is fixed on the date 
of filing.  If a possible thing is inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date a 
claim is filed, the fixation of meaning on that date leads to the exclusion of 
that possible thing from literal claim scope.  Courts that employ a 
denotational theory of meaning must choose between fixation and growth: 
stability in meaning depends on stability in the set of propertized thing-
types, and, inversely, expansion of the set of thing-types described 
necessarily expands meaning.  In sum, AAT cannot literally infringe a 
claim with a denotationally fixed meaning-scope if the post-filing inclusion 
of the AAT within the claim would expand the claim’s thing-scope.194   
                                                                                                                          
192 See David Lewis, General Semantics, 22 SYNTHESE 18, 25 (1970). 
193 Thus, procedurally, a court fixing denotation may initially determine ideational meaning and 
proceed by subtraction of possible things that were inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date of filing. 
194 There are two types of AAT that can infringe without expanding thing-scope and that therefore 
can fall within the scope of a denotationally construed and historically fixed claim.  First, there is 
extrinsic-property AAT, in both its essential and policy-driven ersatz forms.  The mere Cambridge 
growth in thing-scope that such AAT triggers upon its inclusion does not expand the claim’s thing-
scope, at least when measured by the legally relevant metric of thing-types.  See generally supra Part 
III (discussing thing construction).  Second, there is intrinsic-property AAT that actualizes, but does 
not expand, thing-scope.  The basic notion here is that some after-arising technologies result from the 
post-filing discovery of a means of making a possible thing that was already conceptually accessible to 
the PHOSITA on the date of filing.  When discovered, this AAT does not expand thing-scope because 
it was already within the claim’s denotational meaning on the date of filing.  It was a possible thing 
accessible to the PHOSITA on that date.  What changed after the date of filing is only that 
technological progress produced the information necessary to make tokens of that accessible thing-type 
in the actual world, hence the title scope-actualizing AAT.  The existence vel non of tokens of things in 
the actual world described by the claim language is irrelevant to thing-scope, see supra notes 28–29 
and accompanying text, so this post-filing development does not affect thing-scope. 
Although valid literal claims can reach into extrinsic-property AAT, they cannot reach into scope-
actualizing AAT.  This is true regardless of the theory of meaning that a court uses to construe the 
claim, because the obstacle is not infringement and does not result from claim construction doctrine.  
(Scope-actualizing AAT can be described even by claims construed with a denotational theory of 
meaning, so it can also be described by ideationally construed claims.)  Rather, the insurmountable 
hurdles lies in the commensurability analysis of the enablement doctrine: if a claim describes more 
possible things on its date of filing than the PHOSITA knows how to make (i.e. knows how to turn into 
tokens of things in the actual world) at that time, the scope of the claim is not commensurate with the 
disclosure upon its filing.  See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
To illustrate the difference between scope-actualizing AAT and scope-expanding AAT, consider 
two scenarios that address, first, a simplified version of the facts presented in Plant Genetics Systems v. 
DeKalb Genetics Corp. and, second, a hypothetical variant of the case.  Plant Genetics Sys. v. DeKalb 
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  A molecular biologist claims a “plant cell 
containing gene X.”  At the time of filing, there are—and have been for many years—two known types 
of plants: monocots and dicots.  The disclosure accompanying the claim teaches the PHOSITA how to 
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In stark contrast, stabilizing the ideational meaning of a claim on the 
date of filing does not mandate stabilizing the set of thing-types 
propertized by the claim.  The sense of a term is first and foremost a 
mental construct.  It is not the set of things described by the claim, but the 
set of criteria that one uses to determine whether a thing falls within or 
outside the claim.  After the sense of a word has been fixed, a fact finder 
can still query how a newly discovered thing would have been classified by 
the preexisting, fixed linguistic network of expressions.  Because it is 
comprised only of word-to-word relationships, ideational meaning leaves 
open the possibility of anachronistic infringement hypotheticals that 
involve time-traveling objects.  If the PHOSITA at the time of filing were 
to be presented with the allegedly infringing thing (that is technically 
inaccessible to her due to her ordinary level of foresight), would her fixed 
mental construct of meaning describe the AAT?  Later-developed things 
can be examined to see whether they have the properties specified by the 
network of sense relations fixed on an earlier date.  For example, after-
arising coffee sleeves embodying post-claim technology in the form of 
geometries and materials inaccessible to the PHOSITA at the time of filing 
can be transported back in time as part of the infringement determination.  
In contrast, when a fixed meaning implies a fixed reference as it does in a 
denotationally construed claim, there can be no anachronistic infringement 
hypotheticals involving time-traveling things. 
One way to clarify the economic implications of denotational and 
ideational theories of meaning in claim construction is to measure literal 
                                                                                                                          
make only a dicot cell containing gene X.  It does not disclose either literally or constructively how to 
make a monocot cell containing gene X.  The first scenario involves defendants who produce intrinsic-
property AAT in the form of a monocot cell containing gene X.  Critically, this AAT does not expand 
the thing-scope of the claim to a “plant cell containing gene X.”  The PHOSITA at the time of filing 
already knows that the claim encompasses this specific type of AAT; the PHOSITA is able to refer to 
monocot cells containing gene X in conversation without being prescient in a way that destroys her 
ordinariness.  In the language of the actual Plant Genetics Systems opinion, monocot cells containing 
gene X are “not an unknown concept that [comes] into existence only after” the date of filing.  Id. at 
1340.  They are AAT that is “specifically desired but difficult to obtain” at the time of filing.  Id.  A 
monocot cell containing gene X is, at the time of filing, already an object of thought in the PHOSITA’s 
mental world.  Because the meaning of a literal claim to a “plant cell containing gene X” encompassed 
AAT that actualized but did not expand claim scope, the Federal Circuit in its actual holding in Plant 
Genetic Systems invalidated the claim for lack of enablement.  Id. at 1339–44.  In the second scenario 
(the hypothetical variant on Plant Genetic Systems), assume that the researchers produce a different 
intrinsic-property AAT, this time in the form of the apocryphal tricot genus of plants and, more 
specifically, a tricot patent cell that contains gene X.  Unlike the monocot cell containing gene X, the 
tricot cell containing gene X is scope-expanding AAT—the transformed tricot cell becomes a possible 
thing accessible to the PHOSITA only after the date of filing.  The PHOSITA lived for years with the 
belief that all plants were either monocots or dicots.  At the time of filing, tricots are not on the 
PHOSITA’s radar screen as a possible technological innovation.  The PHOSITA of ordinary foresight 
cannot reasonably be attributed with possession of the concept of a tricot plant, let alone a tricot cell 
containing gene X.  Therefore, upon the invention of tricot plants and cells, the thing-scope of the claim 
to a “cell containing gene X” must expand if it is to encompass the AAT.  Whether such scope-
expanding AAT falls within the literal scope of a claim whose meaning has been fixed on the date of 
filing hinges on the meaning of meaning adopted by courts during claim construction.  
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thing-scope on two distinct dimensions: a static dimension and a 
progressive dimension.  The static dimension of thing-scope measures the 
size of thing-scope on the date a claim is filed, and it thus only 
encompasses possible things accessible to the PHOSITA on that date.  As 
its name implies, the static dimension of literal claim scope does not 
expand over time to incorporate later-discovered types of things.  It is as 
broad on the claim’s date of filing as it will ever be.  Inversely, it is the 
progressive dimension that grows over time to incorporate all of the 
possible things that were inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date of filing 
but that come to be encompassed by a claim over time.  At the time of 
filing, the progressive dimension of literal claim scope is a null set, but it 
can grow deep by the time a patent expires.  If a claim is construed 
denotationally, thing-scope is the static dimension of claim scope and 
nothing more.  It cannot grow to encompass possible things inaccessible to 
the PHOSITA on the date of filing.  However, a claim with a fixed 
ideational meaning-scope is the sum of the static and progressive 
dimensions.  It is the progressive dimension of literal claim scope that is at 
stake when a court makes a choice between ideational and denotational 
meaning in claim construction.   
Unlike a denotational theory, an ideational theory of meaning permits 
play, or a degree of freedom, between meaning and reference and, 
therefore, between meaning-scope and thing-scope.  It resolves the 
fixation-growth paradox without contradiction: it allows thing-scope to 
grow throughout the term of the patent without requiring a post-filing shift 
in meaning-scope.195  It leaves open the possibility that the fixed language 
of a claim can read on intrinsic-property AAT that expands thing-scope 
after the date of filing.196 
C.  What Courts Do 
What do courts mean when they say they fix meaning during claim 
construction?  Do they fix denotational or ideational meaning?  This 
subsection argues that ideational meaning is the default but that a more 
precise answer depends on whether the court is construing structural or 
functional language.197  Courts always use ideational meaning to construe 
                                                                                                                          
195 Cf. supra note 79 and accompanying text (arguing that the fixation-growth paradox is an 
equivocation that can be resolved by identifying ambiguities in the concept of claim scope). 
196 Joshua Sarnoff has characterized ideational meaning that fixes the claim’s meaning-scope yet 
allows the claim’s thing-scope to expand as a type of meaning in which there is a fixed meaning and an 
expanding application of that meaning.  Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming 
the Future after Festo, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 403, 428–29 (2005). 
197 The functional/structural distinction is a staple of patent law: “the characterization ‘functional’ 
. . . indicate[s] . . . that an attempt is being made to define something . . . by what it does rather than by 
what it is (as evidenced by specific structure or material, for example).”  In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 
212 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  However, it is not a true dichotomy.  Structural words may be defined 
functionally.  See id. at 215 (Lane, J., concurring) (“[A] ‘door’ is something used to close and open a 
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functional language, but they sometimes flip from ideational to 
denotational meaning when construing structural language. 
1.  Functional Language and Ideational Meaning 
Unmitigated functional claim language in product claims has long been 
one of the bugaboos of patent law.198  In the first half of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court regularly invalidated claims that used 
functional language to describe devices at the point of novelty.199  The 
drumbeat resounding through these opinions is a concern about granting an 
inventor control over a nebulous array of post-invention technologies that 
were inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date the claim was filed.  In 
other words, it is a concern that functionally defined claims lead to 
excessive depth on the progressive dimension of literal claim scope.  As 
the Court stated in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker: 
Just how many different devices there are of various kinds 
and characters which would [fulfill the claimed function], we 
do not know . . . . In this age of technological development 
there may be many other devices beyond our present 
information or indeed our imagination which will perform 
that function and yet fit these claims.200 
These concerns about excessive depth on the progressive dimension of 
thing-scope demonstrate that courts unquestioningly use an ideational 
theory of meaning to construe functional limitations in product claims.  
Only ideationally construed claims can expand over time to encompass 
AAT that expands thing-scope and that was inaccessible to the PHOSITA 
on the date of filing.201  “[D]evices beyond our present information or 
indeed our imagination”202 are per se inaccessible to the PHOSITA at the 
time meaning is stabilized, so denotational meaning would not raise the 
concerns that trouble courts with respect to functional language.  In theory, 
courts could use a denotational theory of meaning to construe functional 
language in product claims, but they never do.203  
                                                                                                                          
passageway; a ‘nail’ is an object used to hold two pieces of material together; a ‘black’ material is one 
incapable of reflecting visible light.”). 
198 See generally Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent Coverage: Defining Scope of an Invention 
by Function, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1994). 
199 E.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); General Elec. v. 
Wabash Appliance, 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938); Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 
245, 256–58 (1928).  
200 Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12. 
201 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the stakes of choosing denotational and ideational meaning 
in claim construction). 
202 Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12. 
203 Stylistically, most product claims employing purely functional claim limitations are written in 
a means-plus-function format, i.e., as a “means” or “device” for performing a particular function.  The 
Supreme Court in Halliburton could have defined the “means” or “device” in question denotationally 
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Courts also unwaveringly use ideational meaning to construe 
functional language in process claims.  Process claims are restricted neither 
by the set of instrumentalities that the inventor discloses204 nor by the 
broader set of instrumentalities deemed accessible to the time-bound 
PHOSITA at the time the claim is made.205  As in product claims, the issue 
is not that functional language in process claims cannot be construed 
denotationally.  Rather, possible-world formulations are merely less 
intuitive to courts when they construe functional claim language.206  
2.  Structural Language and Oscillation207 
The Seventh Circuit’s 1974 opinion in Laser Alignment, Inc. v. 
Woodruff & Sons, Inc. provides an instructive example of how courts 
follow through on an ideational approach to meaning while fixing 
meaning-scope.208  The patented invention involved a new method of 
laying pipe.  Where the laying of pipe had previously used a string as a 
linear reference to ensure the overall alignment of the individual pipe 
sections, the patent taught the use of a focused beam of light.209  It claimed: 
“[a] method of laying . . . pipe sections . . . comprising the steps of [(a)] 
projecting a collimated narrow beam of light from said source position 
along the selected axis,” and (b) using the beam of light to align the pipe 
sections.210  The disputed structural term was “a collimated narrow beam of 
light,” and the allegedly infringing technology used a laser to generate the 
                                                                                                                          
by looking only to the set of possible things capable of performing the function that were accessible to 
the PHOSITA on the date that the claim was made.  With respect to claims written in means-plus-
function format today, Section 112, Paragraph 6 specifies an alternative method of claim construction 
that approximates denotational meaning.  Partially in response to Halliburton, Congress legislated that 
claimants may use functional language “without the recital of structure”—that is, with only recitation 
of a generic structural placeholder such as “means” or “device”—but that courts must limit claim scope 
to accused devices that possess the structure of the device disclosed in the patent specification or that 
structure’s equivalent.  35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006). 
204 See Waxman v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20, 22–23 (1935) (explaining that the defendant did not avoid 
infringement by employing the patented process in a different machine); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 
780, 787–88 (1877) (noting that process patents are not restricted to one instrumentality or machine). 
205 See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 1.03[7] n.625 (2008) (“[A] process patent 
claim may cover . . . the unauthorized carrying out of the process on [a] different, even significantly 
improved apparatus.”). 
206 Philosophers of the possible-world persuasion advocate the use of sets to give substance to 
generic descriptions of events or actions by identifying events “with properties of the spatiotemporal 
regions in which they occur.”  DIVERS, supra note 164, at 10; see LEWIS, supra note 106, at 83–84 
(noting the possibility of identifying an event with reference to the set of “spacetime regions where [the 
event] occurs”).  Courts could quantify over possible spatiotemporal regions as they quantify over 
possible things.  It is likely the same intuitive difficulty that prevents courts from construing functional 
language with a denotational theory of meaning that has also prevented any court from ever applying 
Section 112, Paragraph 6 to process claims, despite the express statutory authorization to interpret 
process claims as step-plus-function claims.  35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6. 
207 Many of the cases discussed in this subsection were addressed by Mark Lemley in Changing 
Meaning, supra note 4, under the rubric of fixed versus changing meaning. 
208 Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974). 
209 Id. at 869 & n.1. 
210 Id. at 869 n.1. 
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reference mark—a technology that was not invented until after the claim 
had been filed.211  
The district court construed the term denotationally.  It held that the 
extension of the term at the time the claim was filed was limited to possible 
things accessible to the PHOSITA at the time the claim was filed.212  
Fixing meaning on a particular date meant closing membership to the set of 
objects that constituted the propertized resource.  
The Seventh Circuit reversed and fixed the meaning of the disputed 
term by fixing its sense or intension: “The laser beam, like the white light 
beam . . . is a ‘collimated narrow beam of light’ called for by the . . . 
patent.”213  The court probed the sense of “collimation,” examining the 
other words in relation to which collimation achieved meaning.  
“Collimation” acquired meaning through a relationship of synonymity with 
the concept of “directionality”; collimated beams of light were understood 
as incompatible with the concepts of light “emit[ted] . . . in all directions” 
and light beams characterized by the “element of divergence.”214  The court 
then implicitly framed the question of infringement as an anachronistic 
hypothetical with a time-traveling object.  If the PHOSITA at the time the 
claim was made were to be handed a laser by a time-traveling judicial 
agent, would she understand the beam of light produced by the laser to be a 
“collimated narrow beam of light”?  Stabilizing meaning on the date on 
which a claim is made did not require finalizing the set of things to which 
the claim could refer.215 
The fact that the example chosen to illustrate a court’s express use of 
ideational meaning to construe structural language dates back over three 
decades could be taken to undermine the position taken here—that 
ideational meaning is the default for structural terms during claim 
construction.  However, no such inference against ideational meaning as 
the default should be drawn.  Ideational meaning is so firmly rooted as the 
default that, in most instances, the presence of AAT inaccessible to the 
PHOSITA at the time of filing is not even brought to the attention of courts 
by the litigants and thus no robust case law addressing the progressive 
dimension of literal claim scope has developed.216  For example, 
                                                                                                                          
211 Id. at 869. 
212 Id. at 871. 
213 Id. at 872.  
214 Id. at 869–70. 
215 Id. at 872.  The court also justified its claim construction on the fact that the structural term 
was used in a process claim.  See id.  However, this aspect of the court’s reasoning goes against the 
grain of contemporary doctrine.  Structural limitations are interpreted in the same manner whether they 
are in object or process claims. 
216 One district court opinion did recently justify at length its ideational definition of the limitation 
“an antiretroviral agent.”  Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 
967, 979, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he temporal context espoused by Phillips is the meaning of the 
term to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention.  The term in question may be a category, 
the contents of which expand over time . . . .”). 
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Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. involved a claim to an 
“information manufacturing machine” filed in 1982, and the plaintiff 
alleged that the claim read on a personal computer connected to the 
Internet in the late 1990s.217  Clearly, many of the things comprising the 
allegedly infringing technology were after-arising things inaccessible to the 
PHOSITA of 1982.  Nonetheless, the issue of AAT was never even raised 
in the Federal Circuit opinion.  To the same ends, consider the coffee 
sleeve hypothetical involving an after-arising geometry.218  If this case 
were litigated, a court would unquestioningly hold that the AAT literally 
infringes.  It would be unlikely even to raise a red flag about expansion of 
thing-scope.  This judicial acquiescence strongly suggests that an 
ideational theory of meaning is at work.219  
The presumption that thing-scope can expand along a progressive 
dimension extends to patent commentary as well.  For example, as Michael 
Meurer and Craig Nard presume in the context of their analysis of the 
doctrine of equivalents:  
An inventor, familiar with [a] trend [toward lighter and 
stronger rackets], should describe the material used to make 
his racket in general terms, and then the patent claim will 
literally cover a racket of the same shape and dimension even 
if it is made from a substance that was not known at the time 
of the patent application.220  
Although an ideational theory of meaning is arguably the default, 
courts flip over and apply a denotational theory of meaning in some claim 
constructions.  The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Schering Corp. v. Amgen, 
Inc. exemplifies denotational reasoning.221  Schering claimed recombinant 
DNA molecules coding for “a polypeptide of the IFN-α type.”222  At the 
time the claim was filed, there was only one known polypeptide that was 
an “IFN-α,” i.e., “IFN-α” referred to only one thing-type.223  After the 
claim was filed, new variants of IFN-α were discovered, and the scientific 
community “acknowledged the possibility of different IFN-α subtypes.”224  
The Federal Circuit construed the term “IFN-α” denotationally and left the 
later-discovered IFN-α subtypes outside of the patent’s literal scope.  
“Because, at the time of . . . application, neither [the inventor] nor others 
skilled in the art knew of the existence of, let alone the identity of, the 
                                                                                                                          
217 Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1327–29 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 72–75 (presenting the after-arising geometry hypothetical). 
219 An alternative explanation for the new-geometry coffee sleeve hypothetical is that a court 
would treat it as ersatz extrinsic-property AAT.  See supra text accompanying notes 141–46.  
220 Meurer & Nard, supra note 75, at 1976–77. 
221 Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
222 Id. at 1350. 
223 Id. at 1352. 
224 Id. at 1353. 
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specific polypeptides now identified as subtypes of IFN-α, those subtypes 
cannot be within the scope of the claims.”225  Stable meaning was 
established through stable reference, and post-claim growth in the set of 
thing-types to which “IFN-α” referred would have triggered impermissible 
evolution in the meaning of “IFN-α.”226  
Similarly, whenever a court broadly proclaims in relation to a 
structural claim term that “later developed technologies may not fall within 
the literal scope of the patent,”227 it presumes a denotational theory of 
meaning.  Whenever a court holds that there is no infringement because 
“no one of [sic] ordinary skill in the art would have or could have 
described such [things] at [the] time” of filing,228 or states categorically 
that claims should not “be construed broadly enough to encompass 
technology that is not developed until later,”229 it presumes a denotational 
theory of meaning.  Such statements are inconsistent with the default of 
pinning meaning-scope to the fixed sense of the claim language.230 
V.  THINGS AND MEANINGS AS POLICY LEVERS 
Courts’ ability to construct things and define meaning demonstrates 
that the fixation and growth theories are not the only options for a logically 
coherent patent doctrine dealing with the relationship between literal claim 
scope and AAT.  The set of infringing technologies propertized by a stable, 
notice-enhancing peripheral patent claim need not be reified into a set that 
is fully enumerable ex ante or that categorically excludes AAT.   
The tendency to reify inherent in the fixation and growth theories is, in 
part, fostered by the prevalence of real-property analogies in patent 
discourse.  Peripheral claims are presumed to “describe the outer limits or 
                                                                                                                          
225 Id. at 1353–54.  
226 Cf. id. at 1353 (“The scientific meaning of ‘IFN-α’ evolved with new discoveries.”). 
227 IPPV Enters. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 595, 606 (D. Del. 2000); see also 
id. at 604–06 (construing the phrase “television program signal” to mean “analog television signal”).  
228 Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1164 
(D. Nev. 2004) (construing the term “scanning apparatus” to not read on devices capable of “scanning 
by means of a laser or CCD camera”). 
229 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., 
concurring). 
230 One coherent category of claims in which courts flip to denotational meaning merits separate 
attention.  Some claims recite a temporal index like “currently” that specifically references what is 
happening at the time the claim is filed.  Cf. LYONS, supra note 153, at 227 (defining one type of 
temporal index as “a means of identifying the world that is actual at the time of speaking”).  Courts 
frequently apply denotational meaning—or at least expressly consider doing so—when construing 
temporal indices.  See, e.g., PC Connector Solutions LLC v. Smartdisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1362–64 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the terms “normally connectible,” “a conventional computer,” 
“traditionally connectible,” and “standard input/output port” are to be understood by their ordinary and 
customary temporal meanings); Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 896–97 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (Michel, J., concurring) (holding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would define “regularly 
received television signal” to include both analog and digital forms); Kopykake Enters. v. Lucks Co., 
264 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that “screen printing” includes “any . . . conventional 
printing process”).  
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boundaries of the invention in the same fashion as the description of land 
in a deed defines the outer limits of the land monopoly.”231  The metaphor 
has explanatory value, especially when a peripheral claiming regime is 
juxtaposed to a central claiming regime.232  However, it is also misleading.  
The metes and bounds of a parcel of land specify the location of a spatial 
boundary and therefore identify a bounded set of propertized tokens of 
things.233  In contrast, peripheral patent claims identify types of things 
rather than tokens of things, and the granularity inherent in a thing-type 
means that thing-types can be fixed while the set of discernable thing-
tokens that literally infringes grows.234  Furthermore, if claim construction 
uses ideational meaning, there is play between meaning-scope and thing-
scope, and peripheral claims fix the only criteria required for inclusion of a 
thing-type in the propertized set, not the set of thing-types included.235  
Once the real-property bias is dispelled, the false choice between the 
fixation and growth theories can be left behind.  Moving forward with the 
economic import of things and meanings openly on the table, there are two 
fundamentally different ways of understanding how courts should 
construct things and define meaning.  The first presumes that things and 
meanings should be entities exogenous to patent policy.  This approach 
searches for stable metaphysical or conventional groundings for things and 
meanings.  Courts’ uniform, unerring treatment of extrinsic-property AAT 
is likely an example of this approach in thing construction.236  Similarly, 
perhaps courts can defer to the understanding of an objective, factually 
determined PHOSITA to sort ideationally and denotationally construed 
claim terms.  Maybe there are some limitations that the average 
practitioner of a technology on a certain date understands to refer to a fixed 
group of possible things (i.e., to denote a fixed extension) and there are 
other terms that she understands to encompass an open-ended category of 
things that meet certain fixed criteria (i.e., to establish a fixed intension).237   
The second approach to constructing things and defining meaning 
                                                                                                                          
231 FABER, supra note 67, § 10:8.1; see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) (using a “metes and bounds” analogy).  
232 Cf. supra text accompanying note 20–22 (comparing peripheral and central claiming). 
233 Actually, the tokens of things within the spatial boundary of a parcel of land can change over 
time.  Erosion and deposit of soil, for example, constantly shift the particles of dirt owned by a land 
owner.  Property in land technically fixes only a spatial container, but the spatial container is an 
acceptable proxy for the set of thing-tokens within it.  
234 See generally supra Part III (discussing thing construction). 
235 See generally supra Part IV (discussing the choice between ideational and denotational 
meaning in claim construction). 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 128–33 (observing that courts never treat extrinsic 
properties as relevant to the identities of thing-types during thing construction). 
237 Cf. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (“It is clear . . . that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that the category 
of ‘antiretroviral agents’ would only expand over time to include these new agents.”); Feldman, supra 
note 12, at 20–21 (suggesting in effect that the Federal Circuit in Schering used a denotational theory of 
meaning because the time-bound PHOSITA understood the term denotationally). 
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acknowledges that both are concepts shaped in some way by patent policy 
relating to the optimal strength and nature of patent incentives.  According 
to this view, things and meanings are “doctrinal policy levers.”238  
Appropriating the terminology coined by Michael Madison, perhaps patent 
courts should construct “things by policy” rather than either “things by 
nature” (if the exogenous distinction is grounded in metaphysics) or 
“things by practice” (if the exogenous distinction is grounded in 
convention or widely shared intuitive understandings).239  Extending the 
terminology, perhaps courts should also generate meaning by policy.  If 
things and meanings are policy levers, the categories of AAT that are 
designated as literally infringing vel non can be identified, in part, based on 
the strength of the patentee’s normative argument for control over the 
category in question. 
The advantage of thing and meaning by policy approaches is that 
literal claim scope can be tailored more closely to the social optimum.240  
                                                                                                                          
238 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1640 (noting a court’s discretion to use 
doctrinal policy levers). 
239 Madison, supra note 80, at 386.  Madison suggests that patent law illustrates a things by nature 
approach to thing construction.  Id. at 411–12.  Although the rhetoric of patent opinions is 
unquestionably influenced by a thing by nature approach, what courts do arguably demonstrates that a 
thing by policy approach often prevails.  See supra text accompanying notes 141–46 (discussing the 
generation of ersatz extrinsic-property AAT during thing construction). 
240 But cf. infra text accompanying notes 250–51 (noting the pervasive uncertainty about the 
socially optimal claim scope).  A counterargument suggests that the reach of literal claim scope into 
AAT should not be tailored at all because patent law should embrace the fixation theory, categorically 
exclude AAT from literal claim scope, and adopt a specialization of doctrinal labor under which rights 
to exclude from AAT are available only under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE).  See Lemley, supra 
note 4, at 120–21 (arguing only the DOE should grant patentees rights to exclude from AAT); 
Cotropia, supra note 3, at 152, 168–201 (presuming that literal claim scope cannot reach into AAT in 
the course of proposing the optimal extent of the DOE’s reach into AAT).  Tailoring the reach of a 
patentee’s rights into AAT with the DOE does have at least one advantage—the timing of the inquiry at 
the time of infringement, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997), 
reveals information about the private and social values of the patented invention that aids in the judicial 
fine-tuning of claim scope.  See Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 2013, 2021, 2028 n.63 (2005) (“Description can be well accomplished at the time an application is 
first filed; scope, however, is often better determined later in time when more information is 
available.”).  However, the availability of the DOE does not provide a good reason to forgo the 
tailoring of literal claim scope altogether.  The DOE undermines the public notice provided by 
peripheral patent claims.  See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29–30 (expressing concern that the DOE 
may “vitiate” the public-notice function of peripheral patent claims).  But see Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 152, at 52–55 (arguing that the scope of a peripheral claim is so uncertain that increased reliance 
on the DOE would not significantly reduce public notice).  If the amount of AAT that falls under a 
patentee’s control in the contemporary patent regime is anything close to the optimal benchmark, then 
taking the fixation theory seriously and relying on the DOE for all protection of AAT would 
considerably expand the role of the DOE and lead to considerably more uncertainty.  Cf. supra text 
accompanying notes 66–78 (noting the pervasive nature of a patentee’s control over AAT in 
contemporary patent law).  Furthermore, a regime of literal claim scope that required the exclusion of 
all AAT might actually undermine certainty as the determination of what is and is not AAT is a 
difficult question that need not be asked in many cases if literal claim scope can encompass AAT. 
Rather, inversely, it is the ability of literal claim scope to reach into AAT that should undermine 
the presumption that AAT is the “quintessential example” of a DOE equivalent.  Smithkline Beecham 
Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  This presumption follows from a 
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Courts can set up rules to massage the strength of patent protection when 
they construct things and define meaning.  Perhaps ideational meaning 
produces claims that are closer to optimal in some technological fields 
because inventors need temporally deeper claims, but denotational 
meaning works better in other fields because temporally shallow claims 
are, on average, more appropriate.  Similarly, perhaps there are some 
categories of after-arising properties of a claimed technology that usually 
should be controlled by a patent owner, but there are other categories of 
after-arising properties that usually should not be controlled by a patent 
owner.  In contrast, if courts’ decisions about how to construct things and 
define meaning are exogenous to patent policy, then courts are more likely 
to dole out identical treatment for pairings of patentees and alleged 
infringers who are distinct from a normative perspective.241   
There are three plausible arguments to support exogenous groundings 
for things and meaning.  They are, however, ultimately unconvincing to the 
extent they suggest that things and meanings should have exclusively 
exogenous groundings.242 
First, exogenous constructions and definitions may take political 
pressure off of courts because they lend patent infringement determinations 
an air of inevitability,243 but this is primarily a private benefit for courts 
rather than a public benefit for society.   
Second, exogenous groundings may sometimes provide strong public 
notice of literal claim scope.  This is an important argument.  If sufficiently 
                                                                                                                          
belief that a patent drafter suffers an unfair handicap in trying to describe AAT at the time of filing.  
Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  The belief, however, is 
based on the unnecessary reification of literal claim scope.  See supra text accompanying notes 231–33 
(noting that a peripheral claim need not be a set of things identifiable in full ex ante).  Coarsely 
constructed things and ideational meaning allow claim drafters to describe at the time of application 
much of the technology that will exist by the time the patent expires.  Furthermore, many of the 
restrictions that prohibit claim drafters from describing AAT literally are the result of deliberate policy 
choices intended to curtail the patentee’s rights, not limits inherent in the nature of descriptive 
language.  In a regime in which courts use the construction of things and the definition of meaning as 
policy levers, the patent drafter is unfairly or inefficiently disadvantaged at the time of filing not by 
after-arising technology itself but by the far rarer phenomenon of after-arising language without which 
the AAT cannot be described. 
241 In other words, the descriptive generalizations of patent claims will likely be more rule-like 
with exogenous groundings because they will be more under- and over-inclusive vis-à-vis the 
justifiable outcome.  See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 47–52 (1991) (portraying rules 
as entrenched generalizations that impose costs in the form of over- and under-inclusiveness in relation 
to the rule’s justification). 
242 A mixed regime is certainly possible; there may be instances in which exogenous groundings 
happen to be extremely clear and correspond relatively well to the desired claim scope. 
243 Exogenous groundings may be appealing to the Federal Circuit because the court often 
describes its role in the administration of patent law as mechanistic or ministerial.  See, e.g., In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing, in the context of the utility doctrine, “public 
policy considerations which are more appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of 
government, rather than this court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and applying 
statutory law”). 
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great, the benefits of increased certainty may outweigh the cost of the 
greater over- and under-inclusiveness that inheres in exogenous 
groundings.244  However, it is far from clear that exogenous groundings are 
categorically more certain than policy-inflected groundings.  Exogenous 
groundings promote certainty only when there is a strong consensus about 
the correct metaphysical or conventional position.  Is there really a single 
thing-type to which each and every allegedly infringing instance of AAT 
most naturally belongs?  Can the meaning of meaning always be 
objectively grounded in the beliefs of the PHOSITA?  Inversely, a thing or 
meaning by policy approach need not turn into a highly discretionary 
standard and unleash courts to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.  So 
long as the policy-inflected things and meanings apply to an identifiable 
category of patents, technologies, or after-arising properties, public notice 
is not harmed by an express thing or meaning by policy approach.245  For 
example, consider the coffee sleeve hypothetical involving an after-arising 
plastic.246  When mechanical inventions are at issue, courts arguably frame 
things coarsely, treating growth in the number of literally infringing 
technologies that possess the property being made from an after-arising 
material as a kind of growth that never generates new thing-types or 
triggers a shift in thing-scope.247  To achieve this end, courts depart from 
the essentialist grounding of what a thing is intrinsically because 
materiality is an intrinsic property.  Things made of different materials are 
not duplicates, and more than mere Cambridge contingency differentiates 
things made of different materials.248  Yet, the thing by policy approach 
does not undermine certainty.249  The rule that literal scope of claims to 
mechanical inventions extends into things made from after-arising 
materials is clear and administrable.     
The third argument in favor of exogenous groundings is that tailoring 
the reach of literal claim scope into AAT so as to further patent policy is 
tantamount to chasing the white rabbit down the rabbit hole: things and 
meanings can become really disorienting really quickly under a policy-
inflected approach because there is no consensus on patent policy.  In its 
strongest form, the argument is simply that policy-inflected groundings are 
                                                                                                                          
244 SCHAUER , supra note 241, at 139–42. 
245 More specifically, public notice is not harmed for the members of the public who have learned 
the relevant patent doctrine. 
246 See supra text accompanying note 72–75 (discussing the coffee sleeve hypotheticals). 
247 See supra note 75 (noting that embodiments of a mechanical invention made out of after-
arising materials can fall within the literal scope of a claim without rendering the claim invalid for lack 
of commensurability with the disclosure). 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 104–09 (discussing the distinctions between duplicates and 
indiscernibles, and real change and mere Cambridge change). 
249 The rule is readily justified on policy grounds: the ex ante incentive to invent (or the ex post 
incentives to commercialize and innovate) would be too paltry if competitors could design around a 
mechanical patent every time an after-arising material is developed. 
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just as likely to decrease the optimality of patent protection as they are to 
increase it given the margin of error in the contemporary estimate of the 
nature and strength of the incentives that the patent regime should be 
providing to promote efficiency.  This argument raises an important point 
that should not lightly be glossed over.  The exposition in this Article of 
how courts construct things and define meaning is not intended to be a 
silver bullet for perfecting the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.  
Neither the construction of things nor the definition of meaning provides 
the form or model of the justifiable patent scope to which the protection 
should be tailored.  What conduct should patent protection incentivize: the 
generation of inventive information, the commercialization of products, the 
coordination of technological progress, or something else?250  How strong 
should the incentives provided by patent protection be on average?  How 
should protection be adjusted for different types of technology?  These are 
difficult questions that one cannot answer solely through a technical 
analysis of thing construction and the meaning of meaning.  These 
concepts are tools one can use to achieve ends, not ends in themselves.  
Nonetheless, it should not be the difficulty of the task that deters the 
creation of a more economically justifiable patent regime.251   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although patent doctrine requires courts to stabilize the literal scope of 
a claim at the time of filing, courts routinely allow claims to grow and 
encompass AAT.  The paradoxical nature of this situation—that literal 
claim scope is simultaneously fixed and expanding—does not present a 
logical impossibility.  Courts can resolve the paradox without contradiction 
by constructing things and defining meaning.  The construction of coarse 
things during thing construction masks the after-arising nature of AAT; it 
permits courts to label the growth in thing-scope that occurs when a literal 
claim encompasses AAT as legally insignificant, mere Cambridge growth.  
The use of ideational rather than denotational meaning in claim 
construction allows thing-scope to expand on a progressive dimension over 
time while meaning-scope remains stably fixed on the date of filing.  
Once the import of thing construction and the meaning of meaning in 
                                                                                                                          
250 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 
440–41 (2004) (arguing that patent doctrine should incentivize races to claim prospects to increase 
consumer surplus that results from invention); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2001) (arguing that patents should 
incentivize the commercialization of technology); Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent 
System:  Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 15, 36, 77–78 (1958) (laying out an incentive to invent theory 
to justify patents). 
251 Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1066–67 (2005) (arguing that utilitarian analysis of intellectual property rights should persist despite 
the difficulty of identifying their optimal configuration). 
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contemporary patent practice is openly acknowledged, courts should not 
feel compelled to seek out the politically safe position in which things and 
meanings are depicted as entirely exogenous to patent policy.  Things and 
meanings are policy levers that courts already do use—and should continue 
to use—to tailor the reach of literal claim scope into AAT in order to 
further the normative goals of patent protection.  
